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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three studies related to accounting disclosure at the
interface of the organization and society. The first study investigates the overlapping
perspectives of legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and
stakeholder theory and integrates these theories into a more cohesive meta-theory of the
organization-society interface. The second study examines whether a corporation’s
charitable contributions represent a corporate social performance strategy or a
legitimation strategy. More specifically, study two investigates, from two competing
perspectives, how corporate executives rationalize their philanthropic actions. The third
study analyzes the relationship between the current tax laws and the fulfillment of
corporate foundations’ social functions. Taken together, these three studies build upon
prior theoretical and empirical work to advance social and environmental accounting
research.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The role of business in society is a vital public policy issue in contemporary
debate, and much of its currency comes from the scale and influence of the modern
business corporation. As business entities have become one of the most dominant
organizations in society, more people are concerned with the role and accountability of
business (Preston & Post, 1975; Frederick, 1978). The actions of influential businesses
affect the lives of individuals in many aspects and shape the prosperity of communities
and the condition of their environments. The society in general expects business entities
to perform their economic functions legally and ethically as well as to be socially
responsible (Carroll, 1979).
Although Friedman (1962) argues the only social responsibility of business is to
make a profit, business entities voluntarily undertake many social activities that may not
necessarily bring direct financial benefits to the firms (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Among
the different social activities performed by corporations, charitable contributions are
perceived as the top of the pyramid of corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1979;
1991), and as one outcome of corporate social performance (Wood, 1991). Moreover,
there have been efforts to extend business reporting into a wider context. In addition to
the traditional financial information, Gray et al. (1997), Elkington (1999), and others
advocate to include business social and environmental performance into business
accounting and reporting. The U.S. Congress proposed to require corporations to
disclose their charitable contribution activities within their financial statements (Gillmor
and Bremer, 1999).

1

Issues pertaining to interactions between organizations and society and the
usefulness of business social disclosure/reporting are of interest to academia as well as to
many stakeholders. Thus, this dissertation aims to provide comprehensive theoretical
explanations and empirical evidence on these issues through the development and
execution of three studies. Each study is discussed separately in the following three
sections.

Study One
Legitimacy Theory, Institutional Theory, Resources Dependence Theory, and
Stakeholder Theory: Are They Commensurable?

Study One investigates the overlapping perspectives of legitimacy theory,
institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory and integrates
these theories into a more cohesive meta-theory of the organization-society interface.
This study concludes that even though the four theories are different in their levels of
analysis and resolution, they are much the same. They share one common objective—to
explain how organizations survive and growth. These theories imply that financial
performance and efficiency may be necessary but not sufficient for business entities to
reach their goal of continued existence and growth. This meta-theory offers an
explanation of why business entities voluntarily undertake social activities, why business
social performance may or may not necessarily be rewarded by financial benefit, and why
the overall numbers of social activities undertaken by corporations tend increase. The
commensurability of these theories provides a sound theoretical foundation to
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substantiate the value of social and environmental accounting research because firms’
undertaking of social activities is crucial for them to maintain their societal legitimacy.

Study Two
Corporate Charitable Contributions:
A Corporate Social Performance or Legitimacy Strategy?

Study Two examines whether a corporation’s charitable contributions represent a
corporate social performance strategy or a legitimation strategy. More specifically, study
two intends to understand or explain, from two competing perspectives, how corporate
executives rationalize their philanthropic actions while their corporations are
concurrently facing other business-related social issues such as poor evaluations of their
employee relations, environmental performance and product safety records.
From a corporate social responsibility/performance perspective, Carroll (1979)
classifies business social responsibility into four categories: economic, legal, ethical and
discretionary responsibilities. He argues that business entities must first focus on
meeting their economic, legal and ethical responsibilities; placing their discretionary
efforts such as philanthropic giving as secondary concerns. Based on this conceptual
framework, corporate charitable donations are expected to be negatively associated with
firm-specific problems (e.g., poor performance records) with employee relations, product
safety and environmental performance. If this postulation holds, corporate charitable
contributions would be a fair representation of business social performance.

3

Conversely, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Dowling and Pfeffer, (1975) and others,
posit that charitable contributions are a means of legitimating business activities. These
researchers argue that the amount of contributions would be expected to change over time
or contexts to the extent that a firm’s legitimacy or social acceptance is more or less
problematic. This argument is consistent with the finding of legitimacy-based
environmental disclosure research that found that firms with a poor environmental
performance record tend to make more extensive mitigating environmental disclosures
(Patten, 2002). In accordance with this legitimation assumption, the relationship between
corporate charitable contributions and firm-specific problems with employee relations,
product safety and environmental performance is expected to be positively related. If this
postulation is supported, the perceived merit of corporate charitable giving could be
misleading.

Study Three
Current Tax Laws and the Fulfillment of Corporate Foundations’ Social Functions:
Evidence from 990-Returns of Private Foundations

Study Three analyzes the relationship between the current tax laws and the
fulfillment of corporate foundations’ social functions. A corporate foundation is a taxexempt private foundation that is funded by a business entity, but is legally separated
from its sponsoring company. Currently, corporations may deduct charitable
contributions, including donations to their sponsored foundations, up to 10 percent of
their modified annual taxable income (Internal Revenue Code Section 170(b)(2)).
Because of this favorable tax treatment and other advantageous tax provisions for private
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foundations, many firms establish corporate foundations to manage all or some of their
donations (Himmelstein, 1997).
The social function of private foundations is to some extent different from that of
traditional charities. While the role of traditional charities is to provide relief to the
underprivileged, and to lessen the burdens of government, the functions of foundations is
to fund leading research that may bring alternative solutions to social and public policy
issues and explore new and uncharted directions in which society may move (Andrews,
1965; Zurcher, 1972; Roelofs, 2003). However, funding activities pertaining to social
and public policy issues are more controversial and vulnerable to criticism than donations
to traditional charities (Mcilnay, 1997). Thus, corporations may hesitate to fund
contentious social programs, such as Planned Parenthood projects, through their private
foundations. Business entities tend to avoid any involvement with social controversial
issues because, as reported by Roberts (1992), corporations with foundations are more
proactive in building good relationships with various stakeholders. Moreover, current tax
laws neither differentiate the functions between foundations and charities nor require or
provide any incentive for foundations to fund research and public policy studies. In other
words, firms received the same tax benefit and perhaps similar degree of name
recognitions when donating to either foundations or charities.
As a result of the discussion presented above, study three hypothesizes that
corporate sponsored foundations give a significantly higher amount of grant monies to
charities than they give to research and public policy studies. The findings of study three
have important public policy applications because if current tax laws do not facilitate

5

foundations to fulfill their social functions, amendments to tax provisions for private
foundations appear to be desirable.

Overall Contribution
Taken together, studies one, two and three, of this dissertation offer several
significant contributions. First, and for most, this dissertation presents a comprehensive
meta-theory of the organizations-society interface. This meta-theory provides a strong
theoretical foundation to sustains and advance social and environmental accounting
research because firms’ participation in social activities is necessary for them to maintain
their societal legitimacy. Second, this dissertation provides empirical evidence on the
functions of corporate charitable contributions and corporate sponsored foundations in
the interactions between organizations and society. All these empirical findings have
public policy implications. Corporate charitable contributions are generally perceived as
an outcome of corporate social responsibility. This dissertation tests whether a
corporation’s donations represent a strategy of corporate social performance or a
legitimation strategy. The results of this inquiry provide empirical evidence to the
ongoing debate over the relevance of corporate charitable contributions disclosure.
Finally, this dissertation also suggests that amendments to the current tax laws regarding
private foundations appear to be necessary because current tax laws do not promote
foundations to fulfill their social functions. In the remainder of this dissertation, each of
the studies is specifically presented in detail.

6
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STUDY ONE
LEGITIMACY THEORY, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY, RESOURCES
DEPENDENCE THEORY AND STAKEHOLDER THEORY:
ARE THEY COMMENSURABLE?

Legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are considered the most influential
theories within the domain of social and environmental accounting research. As Gray,
Kouhy and Lavers (1995) state, to treat legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory as two
totally distinct theories would be incorrect because they are two overlapping theories that
are different in their levels of perception and resolution rather than two competing
theories. In other words, both legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory are interested in
organizations and societal interactions but their approach to decomposing this complex
social phenomenon are different. In addition, Mathews (1993), Gray et al, (1996), and
Deegan (2000, 2002) review a number of theories, and the notion of legitimacy appears
to be relevant to other theoretical perspectives, such as institutional theory, resource
dependence theory and stakeholder theory. For example, when Pfeffer and Salancik
(2003) updated their resource dependence theory, they reemphasized legitimacy as the
fundamental resource on which any organization depends for continued existence.
To what extent do legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence
theory and stakeholder theory overlap? Do these theories provide different foci of
explanation for similar social phenomena? Is it possible to synthesize these theories and
if so would a synthesized theoretical model provide us with a better understanding of the
organization-society relationship? Because of the slightly different but useful insight
provided by each theory, in this study I attempt to integrate these theories. More
9

specifically, this paper explores how these theories can inform and be built upon by one
another, and attempts to integrate these theories into a meta-theory of the organizationssociety interface.
This study provides several significant contributions to the accounting literature.
First, many accounting scholars (e.g., Mathews, 1993; Gray et al, 1995, 1996; and
Deegan, 2000, 2002) agree that there is considerable overlap among a number of social
and organizational theories and the possibility of making “compatible interpretations of
evidence from these different theoretical perspectives” (Gray et al., 1995, p. 55).
Furthermore, Gray (2002, p703) emphasizes that “we need even greater meta-theory” to
sustain and advance social and environmental accounting research. This is the first paper
that attempts to synthesize these theories into a meta-theory. Second, legitimacy theory,
institution theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory are all important
theoretical frameworks that seem to have significant influence in accounting and
organizational research. These theories, however, have been applied and taught as
separate perspectives in research and in business and accounting doctoral student
education. This paper will be a valuable reference to researchers as well as to doctoral
students who are interested in understanding the concepts and potential applications of
each individual theory and the relationships between and among them. Most importantly,
we may see a richer (perhaps better) picture of social phenomena from this integrated
lens than can be attained through relying on one theory alone. Thus, this integrated metatheory should help position different sub-streams of research within a broader perspective
and create a new path for future accounting research and programs.
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This study concludes that although these theories are diverse in their levels of
analysis and specificity, they are commensurable. They share one common goal—to
explain issues of organizational survival and growth--and most importantly, these
theories recognize that economic performance and efficiency may be necessary but not
sufficient to reach the objective of continued existence and progress. From an
institutional legitimacy perspective, legitimacy and institutionalization are synonymous.
From an organizational legitimacy perspective, resources are a medium or representation
of legitimacy. From a stakeholder perspective, the dynamic nature of legitimacy is
amplified and legitimation requires two-way communication and a mind-set of
compromise between the organization of concern and its stakeholder groups.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section begins with
a brief discussion of the notion of incommensurability and presents an overview of the
theories. The following section provides a detailed discussion on legitimacy theory by
bringing some of the recent critical discussions on legitimacy and corporations in the
management literature into accounting research. The notion forwarded by legitimacy
theory would then serve as an overarching concept as I try to understand the relationships
between and among these theories. An application of the study result is then discussed
and limitations are presented in the final section of this study.
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Commensurability and an Overview of the Theories
The theories1 that are of interest in this paper are legitimacy theory (Dowling and
Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995), institutional theory2 (Meyer and Rowan,
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978; 2003), and stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995).

Commensurability

One fundamental issue to be addressed prior to integrating these theories is the
commensurability among them. The notion that scientific paradigms are
incommensurable was forwarded by Kuhn (1970) in his book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. The term “incommensurability” in philosophy refers to the idea that
different paradigms, or theories from competing paradigms, may appear to contradict
each other but because of fundamentally different philosophical foundations, they cannot
be meaningfully compared. Kuhn (1970) states competing paradigms employ different
criteria of acceptability for scientific explanations. Thus, it is impossible to compare the
validity of scientific paradigms from a neutral standpoint. There are two main grounds of
incommensurability:
Ontological incommensurability: ontological assumptions are concerned with the
position of reality in one’s being. In other words, it raises questions about whether reality
is simply given or a product of the mind. The former perspective is referred to as realism

1

These theories have roots in other theories and have been applied by researchers in various academic
disciplines and thus there are several versions of original ones. It is not the objective of this paper to review
all versions of the theories.
2
This is sometimes also called “new” or “neo” institutional theory.
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which views the external social world as real and composed of concrete, hard, and
tangible structures that separate the social world from the individual’s perception of it.
On the other hand, the latter perspective is referred to as nominalism, which sees the
external social world as relativistic and composed of mainly names, labels, and concepts
that enable individuals to communicate. In nominalism, there is no ‘real’ social structure
beyond one’s mind.
The mindset between these two different worldviews also often influences one’s
assumptions regarding the resources of knowledge, the relationship between individuals
and their environment, and the appropriateness of research methodology3. Given these
different viewpoints, there is no common way to perceive the world. Thus, there is no
common measure that can be used to make unbiased judgments between paradigms.
Semantic incommensurability: the terms and concepts of scientific theories in
different paradigms are not mutually intertranslatable (Sankey, 1993). Scientific terms
from different traditions or paradigms have different meanings. The meaning of a term
depends on its role within a theory. Moreover, even if the exact word is used, the same
term in different theories and different paradigms may not have the identical reference.
Therefore, theories cannot be directly compared if the terms they employ do not share the
same meanings or references. In other words, the change in the meaning of theoretical
terms from one paradigm to another provides the other ground for incommensurability.
According to these two criteria above, the theories examined in this paper are
commensurable because they share a similar ontological view, and the references of their
terms are almost identical. All of these theories are considered to be system-oriented

3

See Kuhn (1970) for detailed discussions.
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theories4 (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Thompson, 1967; Gray et al., 1995, 1996), these theories
assume any organization is influenced by the society in which it operates, and, in turn, the
organization also influences society. Organizations work within such interdependencies
to reduce uncertainty and to ensure survival and growth. Thus, these theories have a
shared ontological worldview that they see reality/structures are continually created,
reproduced and reoriented by the interactions among social organizations. And such
interactions become constitutive of their province of meaning or having the power to
enact and establish social meanings. These theories neither perceive that reality is purely
given nor deny the existence of social structures. Their worldview seems to situate in the
middle ground of the spectrum between realism and nominalism.5,6 The semantic
commensurability of the terms used in these theories will be discussed in detail through
out the paper. The core concept of each theory is summarized below.

Overview of the Theories

Legitimacy theory (Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995) focuses on whether the
value system of an organization is congruent with the value system of society, and
whether the objective of organizations is to meet social expectations or to gain social
4

“Open systems” is the term used in management literature.

5

Their ontological view is similar to Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory.

6

In addition, each theory focuses on a particular aspect of this interdependency and may have a slightly
different attitude toward the effect of the social-political environment on organizations. The human nature
assumption is a continuum with determinism on one end and voluntarism on the other. Determinism
assumes that the actions of organizations are controlled by the external social-political environment. On
the other end of the spectrum, voluntarism views that organizations have the freedom to select their own
actions. Legitimacy theory does not declare a human nature assumption but views the value system as
socially constructed. Institution theory tends to be deterministic but both resource dependence theory and
stakeholder theory tend to be more voluntaristic in their views.
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acceptance. Legitimacy theory, however, is neither specified on how the congruency
could be reached nor how the actions should be formulated.
Institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) began
much like legitimacy theory but concentrates on the relationship between environment
and organizations, especially the stability and survival of organizations. While
legitimacy theory itself does not specifically express how to meet social expectation and
gain social support, institutional theory strongly emphasizes that organizations can
incorporate institutionalized norms and rules to gain stability and enhance survival
prospects. Thus, conformity to these established institutional patterns is the pathway to
legitimacy, and to receive support and attract resources.
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 2003) also focuses on
the effects of environment on organizations. However, instead of concerning itself with
social expectation, resource dependence theory attempts to explain the effect of
environmental constraint on organizations. Resource dependence theorists state that
organizations must engage in exchanges and transactions with other entities for various
resources. Because organizations are not self-contained or self-sufficient, they rely on
their environment for support, and the core of the theory focuses on how organizations
gain access to vital resources for survival and growth. Resource dependence theorists
believe that although organizations are constrained by their situations and environment,
organizations possess both the desire and the ability to negotiate their positions within
those constraints through various tactics.
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995) is also concerned with the
effect of environment on organizations. However, as opposed to the other theories
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treating the ‘environment’ as a whole, stakeholder theory focuses on the relationships
between organizations and its various stakeholders who constitute the environment. This
holds true because stakeholder theory recognizes that (1) the impact of each stakeholder
group on the organization is dissimilar, and (2) the expectations of different stakeholder
groups are not only diverse but also sometimes conflicting. Thus, how to receive
support/approval from different influential stakeholders rests upon the ability of
organizations to balance these conflicting expectations.
According to the summaries above (see figure 1-1), it seems that as these theories
attempt to analyze a complex social occurrence into simpler ones, each of them focus on
a different level of analysis or a different level of perspective. The levels of perspective
range from (the highest level of) societal value system to (the lowest level of) stakeholder
expectation. Legitimacy theory seems to have a higher level of analysis than institutional
theory, followed by resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory. And as a result,
legitimacy theory has the lowest levels of specificity on the issue of concern followed by
institutional theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory. However, they
have a shared goal—to explain how organizations survive in a changing society.

The Theories and Their Relationships
Legitimacy Theory

Accounting researchers (e.g., Patten, 1992, 1995; Deegan and Rankin, 1996;
Walden and Schwarts, 1997; O’Donovan, 1999, 2002; Deegan et al., 2000, 2002) have
used legitimacy theory as an explanation of the motivation behind voluntary
environmental disclosure of corporations. Although legitimacy theory provides a
16

foundation for understanding certain managerial actions such as environmental
disclosures, the theory, as it is currently applied, is still in need of refinement (Deegan,
2002). The challenge of legitimacy theory in general, and in explaining the rationale of
corporate environmental disclosure specifically, is that the term has been widely used but
loosely defined. This is not a problem of the theory itself, and the same situation could
be equally applied to other concepts as well (e.g., see Roberts and Mahoney (2004) on the
use of stakeholder language). Suchman (1995, p572, emphasis in original) observes this
situation and states that “many researchers employ the term legitimacy, but few define it”.
Failure to adequately define the concept has also led Hybels (1995) to comment that
legitimacy has been used as a “blind man’s hammer” by social scientists to shelter their
careers and disciplines. What is legitimacy? And what does legitimacy theory explain,
describe and/or predict?

Legitimacy and Legitimation
Lindblom (1994) argues that we must first distinguish between legitimacy and
legitimation. The former is a status or condition and the latter is the process of obtaining
the status or condition. Lindblom (1994, p.2) defines legitimacy as:
… a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system
is congruent with the value system of the larger social system of
which the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or potential, exists
between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy.

Organizations are perceived to be legitimate if they pursue socially acceptable
goals in a socially acceptable manner; given this normative quality, performance and
economic efficiency alone are theorized to be insufficient to obtain or maintain the status
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(Epstein and Votaw, 1978). Thus, legitimacy is not synonymous with economic
achievement or legality because economic success is just one facet of legitimacy, and
legality is theoretically an enforcer, not a creator, of changes in social values (Lindblom,
1994, Deegan, 2002). In addition, whether or not the goals and actions of an organization
are legitimate (desirable, proper, or appropriate) within the socially constructed value
system depends upon the social audience who observe them (Suchman, 1995). The
actions of an organization may deviate extensively from societal norms yet the
organization retains legitimacy because the divergence is unnoticed. Thus, “legitimacy is
possessed objectively, yet created subjectively” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). In other words,
legitimacy is a conferred status that is always judged and controlled by others rather than
by the legitimating organization. As for legitimation, Maurer (1971, p 361) states
“legitimation is the process whereby an organization justifies to a peer or superordinate
system its right to exist.” Thus, legitimacy grants rights not power to organizations. The
processes of financial report environmental disclosure have been theorized and
empirically verified as a tool of legitimation (Lindblom, 1994, Patten, 2005).

Institutional Legitimacy and Organizational Legitimacy
From the above definitions of legitimacy and legitimation, two systems are
identified; these are social system and organizational system. The social system is
theorized at a higher and more abstract level of analysis than is the organization system.
Organizations have the tendency to reconcile (in fact or in appearance) their systems with
the higher order system through the process of legitimation. As mentioned previously,
legitimacy theory itself does not prescribe how the congruency between the two systems
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can be achieved. As a result, Gray et al., (1996), Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Suchman
(1995) and others state that there are (at least) two major camps of legitimacy theory —
institutional legitimacy and organizational (or strategic) legitimacy.7 These camps differ
in their understanding of how the congruency is reached or how the legitimating
organization justifies its position.
From a societal perspective, institutional legitimacy is used to investigate
what/which institutional structures and activities as a whole (such as capitalist economic
structure, democratic government) have gained social acceptance. These established
structures, activities and procedures are used as the base line to evaluate whether the
legitimacy-seeking organization adheres to these expectations, like legitimated
institutions. For instance, in order to gain social acceptance as a typical business
institution, corporations would have an accounting department in their organizational
structure, and then the accounting department would prepare financial statements for their
shareholders. Whether or not such structure and activity would ensure or enhance the
reliability of accounting information is not the concern of institutional legitimacy. This
path of legitimation reinforces the legitimacy of the already institutionalized system--a
capitalistic society in which our analysis of the social and organizational relationship is
situated.
The other camp is called organizational legitimacy or strategic legitimacy
research. Authors in this camp attempt to identify different strategies that organizations
seeking legitimation may adopt. Work in this strategic camp (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990;

7

Gray et al. (1996) place these two perspectives under political economy theory. They name the former
legitimacy of the system (e.g. capitalism) and the latter legitimacy of the organization.
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Oliver, 1991; Lindblom, 1994) often adopts a managerial perspective (a narrower
perspective) and emphasizes the ways in which organizations instrumentally manage and
deploy suggestive symbols in order to gain social acceptance and support. It is from this
perspective that most social disclosure accounting research tends to draw its
understanding of legitimacy (e. g. Deegan et al., 2002; Patten, 2005).

From Abstract to Observable
Although legitimacy and legitimation are theorized to have concrete
consequences, they are both abstract subjects based on abstract logic. As a result, a
number of theoretical questions have emerged. For instance, legitimacy and
institutionalization appear to be synonymous, but to what extent or under what
circumstance is this relationship sustained? Second, is legitimacy itself a survival
resource or is resource flow itself a representation of legitimacy? Third, legitimacy is
subjectively evaluated by observers. Who are these observers and how can organizations
identify them and identify with them?
Hybels (1995) critically reviewed the use of the legitimacy concept and argues
that although abstraction sometimes is necessary in theory building8, well-specified
representation of the abstract concepts of social value, rules and norms may be
identifiable. He stresses that the representation of these abstract concepts may be
revealed through detailed observations of institutions’ structures, actions and resource
flows among constituencies (stakeholders). Hybels (1995) argues that theories are
developed to describe and to a certain extent to predict social-organizational behaviors,

8

Hybels (1995, p245) state “abstraction may be the price of generalizability.”
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and social phenomena are supposed to be observable. For instance, observations of our
governmental structures inform others and us that this society values democratic
government systems in which citizens have the right and freedom to elect their leaders.
Each time as citizens cast their votes, their actions signify their support for this social
value and norm. Observibility is an important element of these theories. Thus, the next
section discusses how the concepts forwarded by institution theory, resource dependence
theory, and stakeholder theory may each provide certain observable traces of the abstract
construct of legitimacy. The center of these observable traces may be different as the
levels of perspective of these theories narrow down. By so doing, I argue that these
theories can be integrated into a meta-theory as they inform and are informed by one
another.

Legitimacy and Institutional Theory

The concepts of institution and institutionalization have evolved over time from
creating social reality to granting social acceptance (legitimacy). The early concept of
institutionalization emerged as Berger and Luckmann (1967) addressed the nature and
origin of social order. They argue that social order is fundamentally based on a shared
social reality that is created in social interactions. Social order comes into being as
individuals take actions, interpret those actions and share with others their interpretations.
Scott (1987) defines institutionalization as the process by which actions become repeated
over time and are interpreted with the similar meanings among society members. The
process of institutionalization creates social meaning and reality for social members to
communicate and for the establishment of social order.
21

Berger and Luckmann (1967) emphasize that institutionalization involves three
stages: externalizations, objectivation and internalizations. For instance, we have socially
created the time scheme (twenty four hours a day, seven days a week and twelve months
a year) for ourselves but as this human product became institutionalized, it turns into a
reality that seems external to us. Our daily activities are scheduled according to the time,
as if it is externally set. We use the schedule to determine where to be and what to do as
an objective measurement, and then we take this measurement result internally to
evaluate our performance and plan our lives. This situation appears to be what Berger
and Luckmann (1967) observe in which we are capable of producing a world that we
later experience as something other than a human product.
The social realities that are established through the process of institutionalizations
have become something known as tradition—the way things are or the way things are to
be done. These traditions or way of life are observable but often become invisible to
individuals who immerse in these social patterns. Weber (1946) states that tradition is an
element of legitimacy because social actors are more likely to accept or approve the
activities and decisions that they are familiar with. This early version of institutional
theory placed particular emphasis on the traditional character of institutional rules and
beliefs as shared social reality and on the processes by which organizations tend to
become instilled with value and social meaning.
As the theory evolved, the focus of institutional theory has also moved from the
establishment of social reality to the institution of modern organizations. In this shift of
direction, there is less emphasis on institutionalization as a distinctive process of social
reality and more focus on the pattern of organizational behavior and the conformity to the
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pattern (Scott, 1987). The work of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell
(1983) both investigate a common question—what makes organizations so similar? They
observed that many dynamics in the organizational environment stem not from
technological or material imperatives, but rather from social norms, symbols, beliefs, and
rituals. They conclude that rational individuals make their organizational structures,
functions and operations increasingly homogeneous not necessarily to increase efficiency
but to meet social expectation or to be socially acceptable. Meyer and Rowan (1977)
state that organizations do not conform to a set of institutionalized beliefs because they
constitute reality; organizations are strategically doing so because they are rewarded with
increased legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities.

Institutionalization and Legitimacy
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identified three types of processes (coercive,
mimetic and normative) that might cause an organization to arrange its structure in ways
that conform to a formal institutional pattern. Coercive process arrives from
governmental regulations. Mimetic approach happens when new organizations embrace
the system of the existing institutions in their field. Normative process occurs when
organization administrators intuitively follow the conventional practices. Scott (1977,
1992) defines structures as indicators of an organization’s socially constructed capacity to
perform specific types of functions. Moreover, Meyer and Rowan (1991, p50) state that
institutionally prescribed structures convey the message that an organization “is acting on
collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner.” However, Meyer and
Rowan (1977) also create the term “ceremonial conformity” to argue that the
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organization might adopt certain highly visible and salient practices that are congruent
with social expectations while leaving the fundamental operations of the organization
intact.9
If legitimacy is said to stem from some socially constructed system of values,
norms, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995), then conformity to this system grants
social acceptance. In other words, in order to be perceived as legitimate organizations,
the pattern of organizational structures and actions is assumed to follow the prescription
of these socially constructed norms and principles. As a result, the feature of the socially
constructed value system is supposed to be institutionalized into every aspect of
institutions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1991; Meyer and
Scott, 1983; Zucker, 1987). Parsons and Smelser (1956, p102) define institutions as “the
ways in which the value patterns of the common culture of a social system are integrated
into the concrete action of its units.” This line of reasoning may have led many
researchers (e.g., Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995) to suggest
that conformity to the structures and rules of a preexisting institution is the easiest way to
obtain legitimacy because sustained institutional patterns must already have the
characteristic of legitimacy. From this perspective, Suchman (1995, p576) states
“legitimacy and institutionalization are virtually synonymous. Both phenomena empower
organizations primarily by making them seem natural and meaningful.”

9

For example, the socially constructed structure for business Ph. D. programs in the United States is
basically consisted of two years of course work followed by dissertation, which is different from the
programs generally structured in Europe. Thus, in order to demonstrate that they are capable of carrying
out quality academic research education, U.S. business Ph. D. programs usually adopt (or adapt to) a
particular set of structures. The usefulness of this type of program arrangement is not uncontestable, yet
the institutionalization of program structure grants social acceptance.
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The perspective of institutional theory is narrower than that of legitimacy theory.
Instead of examining directly the value system of the society, institution theory views the
pattern of the established institutions as the symbolic representation of the social value
system. In addition, the resolution provided by institutional theory is clear--conformity is the basic managerial tactic for organizations seeking legitimation. It is
interesting to note that while accounting researchers in the domain of environmental
disclosure tend to rely on legitimacy theory to frame their studies, institutional theory is a
preferred lens for many other aspects of accounting research such as auditing (Carpenter
and Dirsmith, 1993), accounting profession (Fogarty, Radcliffe and Campbell, 2004),
accounting systems (Covaleski, Dirsmith and Michelman, 1993), accounting regulation
(Bealing, Dirsmith and Fogarty, 1996; Hunt and Hogler, 1993), and change in managerial
accounting (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Burns and Scapens, 2000). Some of these studies
examine how institutionalization confers legitimacy and some critique the value of such
processes. It seems that well-established (institutionalized) accounting practices and
regulation are more likely to associate with institutional theory, and the emerging
accounting procedures such as social/environmental reporting, on the other hand, are
more likely to be based upon the notion of legitimacy.
Although institutional theory offers a reasonable tactic to legitimacy, Gray et al.,
(1996) argue that this type of legitimation practice indeed strengthens the legitimacy of
the current social system (e. g. capitalism). Thus institutional theory is capable of
describing the reinforcement of the existing condition of legitimacy but is insufficient to
explain the changes in social expectation or the dynamics of legitimacy. For instance,
why business corporations might start caring about environment and community issues.
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Apparently, other theories are needed to provide us with a comprehensive understanding
of this social occurrence.

Legitimacy and Resource Dependence Theory

Several researchers (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Deegan, 2002; Pfeffer and
Salancik 2003; Suchman, 1995) agree that legitimacy is like any other resource that
organizations seek for continued existence. Suchman (1995, p576) views “legitimacy as
an operational resource that organizations extract—often competitively—from their
cultural environments and that they employ in pursuit of their goals”. This view appears
to be consistent with the notion of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978; 2003), which emphasizes that whatever resources are vital to the survival of an
organization; the organization will pursue strategies to ensure the continuing supply of
the resources. With this overlap, it is reasonable to further explore how legitimacy theory
and resource dependence theory are related.
Legitimacy theory, institutional theory and resource dependence theory are all
interested in the relationship between organizations and their environment. Legitimacy
theory stresses the necessity to avoid any threat to an organization’s legitimacy, while
institutional theory suggests conformity to the pattern of institutionalized organizations is
the pathway to legitimacy. Both theories, however, are less specific on the consequence
of being or not being legitimate. Resource dependence theory, in contrast, addresses the
effect of legitimacy. Instead of using the abstract expression “legitimacy”, resource
dependence theorists have chosen the less abstract term “resource”, which explicitly
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proposes the objective for an organization in its interaction with its environment is to
obtain resources.
Resource dependence theory was introduced in the book The External Control of
Organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This book explored how organizational
environments affect and constrain organizations and how organizations respond to those
external constraints. The book contained three central themes. The first, and perhaps the
most essential theme is that social context mattered. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, 2003)
emphasize that organizations rely on one another’s support and resources to carry out
their functions. This resource reliance makes the external control and constraint of
organizational behavior both possible and almost inevitable. Thus, analyzing the
environmental situations in which organizations are located and the pressures and
constraints that stemmed from those situations would provide us with a better
understanding of organizational decisions and behaviors.
The second theme reveals resource dependence theorists’ ontological view. They
believe that even though organizations are constrained by their situations and
environment, strategic choices are still available and possible for organizations to pursue
their goals. Indeed, they emphasize that the environment is not only a given condition to
be absorbed, avoided, or accepted. Environment itself is the dynamic outcome of the
interactions of many organizations seeking their own goals and interests. When
organizations face manageable uncertainty and external constraint, they may search for
arrangements or form alliances with others to coordinate their actions. Empirical studies
based on this theory have investigated how organizations strategically managed their
external constraints through selection of employees (Salancik, 1979; Pfeffer and
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Leblebici, 1973), compositions of boards of directors (Pfeffer, 1972a; 1973; Peng, 2004),
and business mergers (Finklestein, 1997; Pfeffer, 1972b; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976)10.
Furthermore, when faced with unmanageable interdependence, organizations would seek
to use the greater power of the larger social system and the government, using tactics
such as political actions, to alter the environment for their needs.
The third main theme of resource dependence theory is the emphasis on power
rather than on economic efficiency. From a resource dependence perspective, some
organizations have more power than others because of the asymmetries of their
interdependence and their location in social space (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Theorists
argue that the government is an important source provider for many organizations such as
schools, health care, and government project contractors. These organizations depend
more on the government for resources than the government relies on them for supplies.
The differences in the degrees of interdependence and social position grant the
government more power than the organizations. As a result, these organizations are more
responsive to governmental regulations and policies (Salancik, 1979; Pfeffer and
Leblebici, 1973). The theory concludes that building close relationships with critical
power organizations that control vital resources is a crucial strategy for continued
existence.
Since the publication of The External Control of Organizations, the empirical
work that applied resource dependence perspective has primarily focused on transactional
interdependence (Salancik, 1979; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973; Pfeffer, 1972ab; 1973;

10

Little recent work is cited because research that applied resource dependence theory in recent years has
concentrated more on networks and alliances (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Networks and alliance are more
managerial oriented rather than organizational emphasized, which is not the focus of this study.
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Finklestein, 1997; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). For instance,
the relationship between the possibility of merger and the amount of financial
transactions between firms. Hence, the major theoretical challenge and critique of this
theory is that resource dependence, with its focus on transactional interdependence,
overlooks many other essential environmental impacts on organizations. Pfeffer and
Salancik (2003, p.xx) acknowledge this omission in the preface of their updated writings
and explicitly claim that resource dependence was originally developed to provide an
alternative perspective to economic theories of organizational decisions and actions, and
“resource interdependence accounted for everything about organizations.”
The relation of resource dependence theory to studies of legitimacy is clarified in
the recent reissue of the original resource dependence text (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003).
In this update, Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) stress that a benefit of studying firm strategies
in a resource dependence tradition is the ability to consider the externally-oriented, nonmarket based actions that companies undertake to achieve organizational legitimacy. In
addition to strategies used to alter interdependence and negotiate with the environment,
Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) state that political actions and alliance are two important
strategies for organizations to create an environment for their needs. However, as to
legitimation strategy, they believe that developing alliances with other organizations that
possess a particular legitimacy is a less criticized but more effective strategy than the use
of political means. Their predictions about the alliance approach are confirmed by
accounting and management research. Fiedler and Deegan (2002) document that seeking
legitimacy was one key incentive for the building and constructions industry to
collaborate with the environmental groups in Australia. In addition, Friedman and Miles
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(2002) analyze the relationship between Greenpeace and environmental sensitive
corporations over the decades. They report the relationship has been transformed from
incompatibility in actions in the 1970s to a partnership for environmental solutions in the
recent years. And the basic momentum of such evolution is from the process of
compromising and alliance.
Based on the renewal of resource dependence writings, it is clear that the
perspective of resource dependence theory is narrowed to focus on critical powerful
organizations. This is in contrast to institutional theory that focuses on institutionalized
organizations in general. The level of specification of resource dependence theory is
increased as the goal of interacting with the environment is precisely stated and the
strategies are explicitly proposed. The proactive organizational tactics prescribed by
resource dependence theory indicate a link between this theory and research of
organizational legitimation strategy.

Legitimacy and Resource Flows
Several researchers (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Deegan, 2002; Suchman, 1995)
agree with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, 2003) that legitimacy is simply like any resource
that organizations must obtain from their environment. In contrast, Hybels (1995)
criticizes such assumption as presenting a tautological relationship between resource
acquisition and legitimacy. Hybels (1995) notes that legitimacy is said to be obtained as
resources are transferred from others to the focal organization, yet legitimacy is required
before external entities will confer any resource. Legitimacy is a symbolic representation
of the evaluation of an organization, which has no material form. Thus, Hybel (1995)
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emphasizes that legitimacy is better characterized as both part of the context for exchange
and a by-product of exchange rather than viewing legitimacy as something ready for
exchange among organizations.
In addition, Hybels (1995) appealed to the asserted relation between resources and
organizational legitimacy forwarded by Terreberry (1968) many years ago. Terreberry
(1968, p. 608) states “[t]he willingness of firm A to contribute to X and of agency B to
refer personnel to X, and firm C to buy X’s product testifies to the legitimacy of X.”
From this perspective, I agree that resource flow is a representation of legitimacy--an
observable measure of an abstract concept-- and I also see the need to understand the
roles played by several organizational constituencies whose interactions with the focal
entity may inform us of the legitimate status of the firm. Hybels (1995, p 243) states that
“ to build a well-grounded theory of the legitimation of organizations, it is necessary
above all to identify the critical actors, both internal and external, whose approval is
necessary to the fulfillment of an organization’s functions”. How is this concept similar
or different from the notion of stakeholder theory? Are these two concepts
complementary to one another? With these questions in mind, I examine the relationship
between legitimacy and the different stakeholders who confer it.

Legitimacy Theory and Stakeholder Theory

Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) like the previously discussed theories is also
concerned with the relation of organizations and their environment. As the social
expectation of business corporations changed, stockholders were no longer the only
constituent group in a firm’s environment. The term stakeholder first appeared in an
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internal memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute in 1963, as a concept used to
distinguish stockholders from any other group or individual who was also relevant to the
survival of the firm (Freeman, 1984). Freeman (1984) defines a stakeholder as any
individual or group who can affect or is affected by the achievement of a firm’s
objectives. From a strategic management point of view, Freeman (1984) argues that in
order to receive the necessary support for the continued survival of the firm, managers
not only have to understand the needs and concerns of these stakeholder groups but also
have to incorporate these needs and concerns into their strategic program.
Not all stakeholder groups have direct influence on the operation of the firm.
Thus stakeholders are separated into primary and secondary categories (Clarkson, 1995).
The primary category includes shareholders, investors, employees, customers, suppliers,
communities and governments whose continued participation is necessary to the survival
of the firm. The secondary stakeholder category includes groups or individuals who
influence or are influenced by the corporation, but they are not engaged in transactions
with the corporation and are not essential for its survival (e.g., special interest groups and
the media). Prior research sometimes questions the necessity of incorporating the needs
and concerns of the secondary stakeholders into a firm’s managerial planning (Jensen,
2002). Freeman (1984) states that secondary stakeholders may be less relevant today, but
if ignored, they could become a powerful group tomorrow and may have a direct effect
on the firm’s operation. For instance, Nestle suffered the consequences of a product
boycott because the firm ignored the request from one of its secondary stakeholder
groups, a social interest group, who wanted a total ban on improper marketing of infant
formula in third-world countries (Sturdivant and Robinson, 1981). Therefore, an
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organization must willingly undertake actions to negotiate with and to satisfy the
expectations of as many stakeholders as possible. Clearly, stakeholder theory does not
embrace a passive approach for management.

Modification in Perspective
Legitimacy is conferred upon the organization by its observers, which is like
beauty is in the eyes of the beholder. Since legitimacy is judged subjectively by various
stakeholders, the same organizational activity would not necessarily be judged equally by
different stakeholder groups. From this perspective, whether or not the objectives and
actions of an organization are legitimate essentially depends upon the value systems of
stakeholder groups rather than the value system of the larger society.
While legitimacy theorists usually emphasize the importance of compliance with
the expectations of society, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) explicitly recognizes that
society is composed of different constituents (stakeholders) who have different and even
conflicting expectations of firms. While resource dependence theory concentrates on
external organizations with power and resource, stakeholder theory acknowledges that
stakeholder groups (both external and internal) have unequal power and ability to
influence the actions of an organization (Mitchell et al., 1997). Stakeholder theory
explicitly recognizes the expectation differences among various groups and stresses the
importance for organizations to meet the expectation of as many stakeholder groups as
possible (Freeman, 1984).
Gray et al. (1995) and Deegan (2002) both suggest that this change in analytical
focus may be evidenced by Lindblom’s (1994) most cited legitimacy paper. She
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discusses the concerns of the “relevant publics” rather than the expectations of the
“society”, which may indicate that proponents of legitimacy theory are shifting the focus
from the value system of the larger society to the expectations of particular groups within
society. The scope of stakeholder theory has further narrowed to focus on how firms can
strategically manage the demands of particularly powerful stakeholders (see Ullman,
1985; Roberts, 1992; Neu et al., 1998).
Although Freeman (1984) attempts to present stakeholder theory as a normative,
strategic management practice for contemporary organizations, the stakeholder approach
offers no concrete, unarguable prescriptions for what a corporation should stand for.
According to Freeman (1984, p 210), the stakeholder approach “presents a framework for
discussing a host of differing moral views”, and does not prescribe particular positions of
moral worth to the actions of managers and the board. From this perspective,
stakeholders could confer different conceptions of legitimacy to an organization
depending on the value system of the particular stakeholders. Suchman (1995) suggests
three different legitimacy conceptions. Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-interested
calculations of the stakeholders who do the evaluation, which means some stakeholder
groups may see particular organizational actions or policies as legitimate as long as these
actions or policies are in their favor. Moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative
evaluation of the organization and its activities, in which stakeholders base their
judgments on whether a given activity is “the right thing to do”, rather than whether the
activity simply benefits them. Cognitive legitimacy is based on cognition rather than on
interest or evaluation. Organizations are perceived to be cognitively legitimate if their
structures and activities follow established pattern of other organizations that are
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comprehensible and familiar to the stakeholder groups. The three conceptions of
legitimacy differ based on the value standards used by stakeholders to confer legitimacy.

Communication and Compromise
Given this dynamic and complex nature of legitimacy, both Dowling and Pfeffer
(1975) and Lindblom (1994) propose that if an organization perceives that its legitimacy
is in question, the organization can attempt to change or manipulate the perceptions of
those who confer legitimacy. Because legitimacy is always subjectively judged and
conferred by others (Suchman, 1995), legitimation strategies in concept should be based
upon the organization’s understanding of stakeholder perception. Freeman (1984, p166),
however, states that most organizations tend to tell their side of the story without
knowing what the stakeholders’ expectations are, and “this approach often simply incites
a stakeholder group to action.” Inaccurate assumptions in legitimation strategy may
trigger a series of unexpected actions from stakeholder groups, which may eventually
decrease legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).
The concept of “stakeholder” is introduced as one way to revise the conceptual
maps of managers11. Within the current corporation structures, the key to successful
interaction with stakeholders requires the willingness to communicate and compromise
(Freeman, 1984). If the results are to be meaningful, communication processes with
stakeholders must be two-way, in which the positions of both sides are understood by one

11

Freeman (1984, p249) states that the main conceptual maps that the managers need to revise are the
fiduciary to stakeholders and the notion of distributive justice, and emphasizes that “the sledding is rough,
but the question cannot be avoided.”
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another. Although proponents of legitimacy theory also emphasize the importance of
communication (Suchman, 1995), they seem to be more interested in the strategic use of
unilateral corporate communication such as environmental disclosures.
Most importantly, Freeman (1984) stresses the willingness of compromise rather
than the intention of manipulation. The central idea of communication is
“compromising”, which involves “giving up certain things to get other things” (Freeman,
1984, p169). The processes of communication provide managers the opportunities to
explicitly recognize the possible overlapping interests between the company and key
stakeholders. Managers, therefore, have a clear understanding of what they need to give
up to get stakeholder support or action on an issue. Freeman (1984) states that from time
to time, managers must take risks and commit themselves to positions that run counter to
past company policy or even common practice. The willingness to do this is the
foundation to successful stakeholder management.
Corporate managers engaging in stakeholder management via environmental
disclosure seem not really inclined to social change. For instance, based on 355 sets of
projected/actual spending drawn from 10K reports, Patten (2005) reports that actual
spending for pollution abatement and control equipment was lower than the projected
amount for more than 75% of the observations. This suggests that business corporations
are manipulative rather than sincere in their environmental disclosure communication
practice. This process of attempted legitimation is more likely to reinforce the status quo
of traditional practice. On the other hand, the concept of compromise forwarded by
stakeholder theory may provide organizations with a rationale for attending to their social
acceptance and not only their economic profit.
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The concept of compromise may explain why business corporations are
voluntarily undertaking a number of social activities such as charitable contributions,
employee matching gift programs, and community event sponsorship. While the
phenomenon of change in social expectations of business is a complicated one, not
reducible to a single cause, I suggest the process of compromise may in turn provide the
momentum for change in social expectation. For instance, the initiation of certain
community event sponsorships could be a compromise between a business entity and its
community stakeholder group. As this practice gains its social acceptance, it may
become a legitimized norm for business entities that operate in the community and
become a societal-level expectation.

An Application of the Current Study
Friedman (1962) and Bakan (2004) argue the only social responsibility of
business organizations is to make profit. From this perspective, researchers would argue
that business organizations should only undertake social activities if such activities would
enhance shareholder value. Yet, corporations voluntarily undertake many social
activities that may not necessary bring direct financial benefits to the firms (Hillman and
Keim, 2001). Corporate executives could have a variety of motivations for voluntarily
undertaking certain socially desirable activities. Nonetheless, within the domain of
corporate social responsibility/ performance (CSP) research, a simplistic connection
between social performance and economic benefit is usually implied (Griffin and Mahon,
1997; Ullmann, 1985; Wood and Jones, 1995). After decades of research, however, two
critical questions remain unanswered.
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First, is there a positive relationship between corporate social and financial
performance? If the answer is yes, then why are the results of more than three decades of
research incompatible (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Margolis and Walsh, 2001)? If the
answer is no, then how do managers rationalize their decisions? Second, why do the
numbers of social activities undertaken by business organizations seem to be growing (or
why are societal-level expectations for business’ social activities increasing)? Limited by
an economic focus and assumed stockholder primacy, Hillman and Keim (2001) admit
that there is a gap in our understanding of the interactions between business corporations
and society, especially, in the case of social issue participation.
This paper now advances two propositions that provide partial answers for these
questions. I conclude that the continued existence of any social institution, including
business entities, is conditioned by its societal legitimacy. Business organizations are
perceived to be legitimate when their actions are congruent with the expectations of those
who confer the status of legitimacy. Based on this theoretical argument, economic
performance and efficiency appear to be necessary but not sufficient to ensure firm
survival and growth.
Prior research on corporate social and financial performance evidently has
overlooked the fact that not all firms start a similar social activity at the same time. Why
do some firms choose to initiate social programs and others are just simply following the
trend? This is an important variable because the primary motivation of firms to initiate or
adopt a particular social activity may be reflected in the timing of such undertaking.
Thus, the relationship between corporate social performance and economic benefit may
be dependent upon the timing to undertake a particular social activity among different
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firms. For instance, as a socially desirable activity spreads, a threshold is reached beyond
which adoption provides legitimacy rather than improves financial performance
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This economic benefit is
diminished when other organizations in the field start to mimic the actions of these
leaders. Consequently, these activities began to gain social acceptance and eventually
become a common expectation of doing business in the field. Hence:

PROPOSITION 1. Legitimacy is the sole reward when social activities
undertaken by business corporations merely meet well-established social
expectations.

It is possible for some managers to rationalize certain business social activity
because those activities are consistent with the role and legitimacy of business
organizations (Margolis and Walsh, 2001). In most capitalist societies, this view is
unlikely to be the dominant belief because financial responsibilities are of fundamental
concern of most business institutions (Carroll, 1979). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue
that early initiators of innovative social activities are commonly driven by a desire to
improve economic performance. Examples of this practice include the Apple Computer
educational technology grants for schools, or the American Express credit card donation
project for the Statue of Liberty. When the social performance of business entities is
above and beyond expectation of their targeted stakeholders, the relevant stakeholders are
theorized to usually reward such actions. Typically this benefit is engaged by early
adopters of a sound practice. Thus:

39

PROPOSITION 2. There is a short-term economic benefit available when social
activities initiated by business corporations exceed the expectations of their
targeted stakeholders.

In sum, some business entities initiate social activities for economic benefit, and
others may undertake such activities to manage their societal legitimacy. As this situation
is continually repeated, momentum spirals to broaden the social expectation of business
corporations.

Discussion and Closing Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the overlapping perspectives of
legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder
theory and to integrate these theories into a more cohesive meta-theory of the
organization-society interface. Several scholars recognize these theories share some
common characteristics, yet how they are really related is unclear. This current study
presents the relationships among the theories explicitly (figure 1-1). Legitimacy theory
states that legitimacy is a status or condition that is achieved when the value system of an
organization is congruent with the value system of the larger society. Organizations seek
this status through the process of legitimation. This broad societal-level view, however,
is primarily based on abstract concepts and reason. As a result, it does not offer any
solution on how the congruency could be practically obtained or empirically examined.
Depending on the purpose of legitimation, there are primarily two levels of legitimacy---
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institutional legitimacy and organizational (or strategic) legitimacy. The process of
seeking institutional legitimacy is directly related to institutional theory. The concepts of
resource dependence theory and stakeholder theory are more relevant to the process of
strategic legitimacy.
Institutional theory proposes that the institutionalized value patterns of a social
system are integrated into the concrete behaviors of its institutions. The scope is limited
to the patterns of established institutions as the symbolic representation of the social
value system. Institutional theorists believe that conformity to long-established
institutional norms is the path to institutional legitimacy. This process of legitimation in
turn also reinforces the legitimacy of the social value system. As Proposition 1 suggests,
societal legitimacy is the reward when activities undertaken by organizations are merely
in conformity to institutionalized social expectations.
Instead of focusing on the social value system or institutionalized social patterns,
resource dependence theory adopts a more narrow perspective. The theory focuses on
how organizations collaborate with other powerful external organizations that control
vital resources required for continued existence. Most importantly, I agree with Hybels
(1995) that resource flows are an observable representation of the abstract concept of
legitimacy. From this point of view, legitimacy and resources are much the same.
Finally, stakeholder theory recognizes that legitimacy is subjectively evaluated
according to the value standards of stakeholder groups, rather than the value system of
the larger society. Freeman (1984) emphasizes that the willingness to communicate and
compromise is the required solution to stakeholders’ approval and support. As suggested
by Proposition 2, organizations may receive a short-term economic return if the
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performance of their initiated activities is beyond the current expectations of their
stakeholders. When other organizations begin to imitate these leaders, soon a threshold is
reached. As a result, implementation of such imitative activities confers legitimacy rather
than economic returns. This course of action, in part, gives force to the changes of social
expectation (legitimacy).
The analysis shows that although these theories are different in their levels of
perspective, and levels of specificity and resolution, they are much the same. They have
a common goal--to explain how organizations ensure survival. Most importantly, they
realize that financial performance and efficiency may be necessary but not sufficient for
organizations to reach this objective. This commensurability provides a strong
theoretical foundation to sustain and advance social and environmental accounting
research, because firms’ participation in social activities is indispensable for them to
maintain their societal legitimacy.
These theories are important to the field of accounting and organizational research,
and this analysis reveals that it is more meaningful to consider them as components of a
greater whole rather than to treat them as totally unrelated concepts.

This meta-theory is

capable of making compatible interpretations of organization-society relationships and
issues from various perspectives because it embraces different levels of perspectives and
resolution. The integration of these theories provides us with a better understanding of
each individual theory and a broader view of the organization-society interface.
This integrated perspective presented in this paper, however, is somewhat
simplistic and not uncontestable. In order to reduce the complexity, I have tried to limit
my focus to the original notions of these theories. This choice unavoidably has omitted
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many profound insights regarding the implication of these theoretical concepts.
Nevertheless, this paper is the first study to demonstrate the possibility of incorporating
several theories into a meta-theory, and reveals the usefulness of investigating a
particular social occurrence through more than one theoretical point of view.
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Legitimacy Theory
Social value system

Scope of perspective:
Focal point:

If the values system of an organization is
congruent with the value system of society

Rationale of actions:

To meet social expectations or to gain
social acceptance

Change the
value system

Reinforce the
value system
Institutional legitimacy

Strategic legitimacy

Resource Dep. Theory
Scope of perspective:
Institutionalized social
structures

Scope of perspective:
External organizations

Focal point:
How to conform to the
established patterns of
other similar social
institutions

Focal point:
How an organization can
gain access to relevant
resources

Rationale of actions:
To gain legitimacy, and
to attract resources

Rationale of actions:
To obtain vital resource
for survival and growth

Figure 1-1 Relationships among Theories
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Stakeholder Theory
Scope of perspective:
Internal and external
stakeholder groups
Focal point:
How a firm can balance
the conflicting demands
of various stakeholders
Rationale of actions:
To obtain approval from
powerful stakeholders

Proposition 2

Proposition 1

Institutional Theory

STUDY TWO
CORPORATE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS:
A COROPRATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE OR LEGITIMATION STRATEGY?

Introduction
The relationship between businesses and society has been a subject of much
discussion. The general public does not only require business entities to undertake their
economic function legally and ethically but also expects corporations to voluntarily share
some of their resources with the society in which they operate (Carroll, 1979; 1991;
World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), 2005). In addition to
large firms, shareholder activists tend to target firms that have poor employee practices,
product safety issues and environmental concerns when demanding changes in corporate
practices (Rehbein, Waddock and Graves, 2004). Because firms have limited resources,
how corporate executives rationalize their philanthropic behavior and their other
business-related social performance activities is under constant examination. Moreover,
whether or not corporations should be required to disclose their social activities such as
charitable contributions in their financial statements is an ongoing debate (e, g. Gray et
al., 1997; Elkington, 1999; Gillmor and Bremer, 1999) among many stakeholder groups.
Prior management research in the domain of corporate social
responsibility/performance positions corporate charitable contributions at the top of the
pyramid of corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1979; 1991) and as a primary
outcome of corporate social performance (Wood, 1991; Griffin and Mahon, 1997).
54

According to Carroll’s (1979) scheme of corporate social responsibility, discretionary
responsibility such as corporate philanthropy is subject to a last in first out (LIFO)
method of placement on a firm’s action inventory (Wood, 1991). Thus, business entities
first fulfill their economic, legal and ethical responsibilities and then attend to their
philanthropic affairs. In accordance with Carroll’s (1979) conceptual framework,
corporate charitable contribution and firm-specific problems such as employee relations,
product safety and environmental performance are expected to be negatively related. It is
because the more resources a firm has to spend to improve their employee relations,
product safety and environmental performance, the less resources the firm has left over
for philanthropy. If this view of corporate strategy is correct, then corporate charitable
contributions would be a reasonable indicator of corporate social performance.
On the other hand, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Dowling and Pfeffer, (1975) and
others, have argued that charitable contributions are a form of legitimating behavior, and
that the amount of contributions would be expected to vary over contexts or over time to
the extent that legitimacy is more or less problematic. This argument is consistent with
environmental disclosure research results documenting that firms who have a poorer
environmental performance records tend to make more extensive mitigating
environmental disclosures (Patten, 2002). Based on this legitimation assumption,
corporate charitable contributions and firm-specific problems with employee relations,
environmental performance and product safety are expected to be positively related.
If the legitimation perspective is correct, then the perceived merit of corporate
charitable giving could be misleading. Corporations that donate a substantial amount of
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resources may be perceived as socially responsible firms, yet in fact they may be culpable
when their other socially related business practices such as reduction in workforce, and
negative environmental impact are concurrently examined. Most importantly, this
legitimation practice can lead to unjustified resource allocation and hinder social progress
(Puxty, 1991) because currently corporations are rewarded, via tax deduction and other
recognition, for their donations regardless of their other business-related social
performance. As a result, the public loses the tax revenue that would be received if not
for the deductibility of corporate charitable contributions. Moreover, the public
eventually must cope with certain costs that are transferred by detrimental business
practices, such as harmful environmental impact of production and unsafe products, to
society. Societal resources may be wrongfully rewarded to corporations that in reality
should be penalized if their other actions are also accounted for.
The purpose of this study is to explore whether corporate charitable contributions
are representations of corporate social performance as theorized by Carroll (1979; 1991)
and Wood (1991) or corporate legitimation actions as theorized by Dowling and Pfeffer,
(1975). To date, no published study has directly examined the relations between
charitable contributions and business-related social issues, nor has a published study
simultaneously investigated these phenomena from different conceptual viewpoints. This
study extends existing research by examining these relations through the juxtaposition of
two different theoretical perspectives and by using the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini
(KLD) corporate social performance ratings to empirically test predictions derived from
each perspective.
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Furthermore, the results of this current study are relevant to the ongoing efforts to
extend business reporting and accounting into a wider context (e, g. Gray et al., 1997;
Elkington, 1999; Gillmor and Bremer, 1999). From a shareholder perspective, the U. S.
Congress proposed an amendment that requires public corporations to disclose
information regarding their charitable contributions (Gillmor and Bremer, 1999). The
proposed legislation states that shareholder access to corporate information is essential
for the proper functioning of U. S. securities markets1. This proposed legislation focuses
primarily on the ownership of corporations. Should shareholders be the only group who
are entitled to corporate information? From a broader perspective, Gray et al., (1997) and
others advocate for social accounting2 that emphasizes the rights for various stakeholders.
These researchers argue that all stakeholders have the right to information, and
organizations have the duty to provide an account of their actions. They are not
concerned with whether stakeholders use the information or how stakeholders use it.
Gray et al., (1997) describe social accounting as the presentation of information about
organizational activities to parties other than directors and controllers of the reporting
organization. Although corporate reporting is traditionally financial in nature, the
increased use and application of the term “triple bottom line” (Elkington, 1999) in the
business world indicates that financial reporting alone is insufficient to meet the needs of
various stakeholders. Currently, some corporations voluntarily apply the triple bottom

1

This proposed legislation is still in the U. S. Congress, and the preliminary response from the Securities
and Exchange Commission regarding this proposal is that the amount of charitable contributions is not
material.
2
A wide variety of terms have been employed in social accounting such as social audit, social
responsibility accounting, corporate social reporting, ethical audits and others.
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line approach to report their financial, social and environmental performances and link
their practices to the idea of sustainable development.
The findings of this study can provide insights into the usefulness of the various
reporting proposals. If charitable contributions are representations of corporate social
performance, charitable contribution disclosure within financial statements, as proposed
by the Congress, can be the first step to stakeholder rights for information. In contrast, if
charitable contributions are legitimation tactics used by corporations, requirements for
corporations to report their financial, social, and environmental performances
simultaneously in one statement seem more appropriate.

Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development
Carroll’s (1979) conceptual model of corporate social performance, and Dowling
and Pfeffer’s (1975) framework of organizational legitimation appear to be instructive in
explaining organization -society interactions. Yet, I argue that these two conceptual
schemes postulate competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between corporate
charitable contributions and business-related issues such as the management of employee
relations, product safety and environmental performance. The conceptions of these two
frameworks and their corresponding hypotheses are articulated below.

Corporate Social Performance

Carroll’s (1979) conceptual model of corporate social performance has set a
foundation for corporate social responsibility and performance research (e.g. Wartick and
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Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991; Swanson, 1995). According to Carroll (1979), corporate
social performance involves three components: (1) the identification of the domains of an
organization’s social responsibility; (2) the development of processes to evaluate
stakeholder demands; and (3) the implementation of programs to manage social issues.
The first component, business social responsibility identification, is necessary because
different responsibilities may be evaluated by different stakeholder groups in different
ways and trigger dissimilar management actions. For instance, shareholders may be most
interested in the financial returns of their investment. In order to meet their shareholders’
expectation, corporate managers may choose to reduce their direct labor cost by
outsourcing part or all of their assembling work overseas. Intentional layoffs of domestic
laborers, on the other hand, may not be considered an ethical management practice for
other stakeholder groups, especially for employees and their families. Thus if corporate
managers are not only concerned with their financial responsibilities, outsourcing may
not be the best choice. Carroll (1979) divides business social responsibility into four
categories: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary responsibilities.
Economic responsibilities. The first and foremost social responsibility of
business is economic in nature, which is to produce goods and services that society wants
and needs, and any other legally sanctioned actions required to carry out these functions.
Unless the business fulfills its economic functions, then it will neither have the resources
to perform other roles nor will it survive long enough to be an agent for any form of
societal change. A similar notion has also been forwarded by Bakan (2004) and
Friedman (1962).
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Legal responsibilities. Society grants business institutions the right to reach their
economic goals and explicitly requires businesses to fulfill these goals within the
framework of legal requirements. However, the line between economic and legal
responsibilities of business cannot be easily drawn. For instance, product safety and the
ramifications of production processes on the health of employees would each be
considered matters of economic and legal responsibilities.
Ethical responsibilities. Though less well defined, society has expectations of
businesses over and above legal requirements. Ethical responsibilities call for business
corporations to make their policies and practices consistent with societal values in such
matters as fair employment practices and a harmless environmental impact of production.
Workforce reduction, for instance, is a legally acceptable business practice yet it could be
ethically controversial (Cascio et al., 1997).
Discretionary responsibilities. In Carroll’s framework, discretionary
responsibilities are socially desirable actions taken by business entities that are beyond
their economic, legal and ethical obligations. The public anticipates business
corporations to voluntarily contribute their financial and human resources to the general
improvement of society. Activities such as philanthropy and community leadership are
examples of discretionary responsibility. Because Carroll (1979) defines these activities
as discretionary, businesses may choose, or have discretion over the type, timing, and
extent of their involvement.
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Hypotheses

Carroll (1979) emphasizes that any given business action could have economic,
legal, ethical, or discretionary motives embodied in it, but actions can be categorized as
primarily having one of these four motivations. Although all of these business
responsibilities may be simultaneously expected, business history reports that companies
placed an initial emphasis on the economic, then added legal responsibilities, and later
showed a concern for their ethical and discretionary responsibilities (Carroll, 1979).
Corporate executives are subject to multiple and even competing demands from various
stakeholders (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999). Several studies investigate how
managers prioritize their limited resources to fulfill the economic, legal, ethical, and
discretionary expectations placed on their organizations. Aupperle et al, (1985) surveyed
241 corporate executives to test the relative values or weights of each of the four
components of Carroll’s (1979) framework. The relative degrees of importance the
executives place on each component were: economic = 3.5, legal = 2.54, ethical =2.22
and discretionary = 1.30. The empirical results also suggest that the more concerned a
firm is with its economic responsibilities, the less interest it has in its ethical and
discretionary responsibilities. A similar prioritization result was also reached by Ruf et
al., (1993) when they applied an analytic hierarchy process to determine the relative
importance of corporate social performance. Thus, among these four types of
responsibilities, discretionary responsibilities are weighted as being least important. This
consistent finding led Wood (199, p. 698) to argue that discretionary responsibilities such
as corporate philanthropy are “subject to a last in, first out (LIFO) method of placement
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on a firm’s action inventory.”
More recent empirical work (Rehbein, Waddock and Graves, 2004) reports that
in addition to large firms, companies that have problems over employee relations, product
safety issues and environmental performance are more likely to be targeted for operation
improvement by shareholder activists. According to Carroll’s (1979) scheme, favorable
employee relations are important for a business to perform its economic functions. In
order to fulfill its economic responsibilities and to reduce the risk of activists’ criticism,
firms that have employee relationship problems are theorized to devote more of their
resources in employee relationship improvement, and therefore have fewer funds
available from which to make charitable contributions. Thus, the following hypothesis is
offered.

H1a: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and
firm-specific problems with employee relations are negatively related.

Tinker and Niemark (1987, p.84) state that “the public, in general, became
increasingly aware of the adverse consequences of corporate growth”. The society’s
concerns of the negative environmental impacts of business production and development
are evidenced by the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency and other
environmental related policies and regulations. Some specific examples are the
implementations of the Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (the “Superfund”) and
Toxic Release Inventory (Environmental Protection Agency, 2004). Compliance with
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environmental regulations is a legal responsibility. Currently, the U. S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations and accounting standards require publicly
traded corporations to disclose environmental related information in their financial
statements and 10K reports (Berthelot et al., 2003). In addition, the results of a national
survey of shareholders who own at least 100 shares of one stock on either the New York
or American Stock Exchange indicate that shareholders prefer companies to spend money
on environmental pollution prevention rather than to give to charities (Epstein, 1993).
This result is consistent with Carroll’s (1979) responsibility scheme; corporate executives
consider fulfillment of their legal responsibility is more important than charitable giving.
The discussion leads to the following hypothesis.

H1b: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and
firm-specific problems with environmental issues are
negatively related.

As previously noted, any given business action may result from several business
motives. Product safety, for example, is an ethical as well as a legal responsibility under
current regulations. Businesses are expected to manufacture safe products, and under the
requirements of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Food & Drug
Administration (FDA), the National Highway & Traffic Safety Association (NHTSA),
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), product safety is also a legal
requirement. Product safety concerns would adversely affect the ability of firms to carry
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out their economic functions. Epstein (1993) reports that product quality and safety are
perceived by shareholders as the top business responsibility (91%) over environmental
protection (85%) and charitable contributions (36%). In accordance with Carroll’s (1979)
framework, business managers should first allocate their resources to improve the safety
and quality of their products because this choice meets their economic, legal, and ethical
obligations. Then they may consider their philanthropy expectations such as charitable
donations. Thus, the following hypothesis is postulated.

H1c: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and
firm-specific problems with product safety are negatively related.

Legitimacy and Legitimation

An alternative view of charitable contributions is from the perspective of
legitimacy theory. Study One of this dissertation, examining the commensurability of
legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory and stakeholder
theory, concludes that although these theories are different in their levels of perspective,
specificity and resolution, they share one common goal --to explain how organizations
survive and endure in a changing society. And most importantly, these theories realize
that financial performance and efficiency may be necessary but not sufficient conditions
for organizations to reach of objective of survival. The continued existence and
development of any social institution including business entities, is conditioned upon its
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societal legitimacy. Organizations are perceived to be legitimate when their goals,
methods of operation and outcomes are congruent with the expectations of those who
confer legitimacy (Lindbolm 1994).
Firms are expanding efforts to manage their legitimacy because it “helps to ensure
the continued inflow of capital, labor and customers necessary for viability… it also
forestalls regulatory activities by the state that might occur in the absence of legitimacy…
and pre-empts product boycotts or other disruptive actions by external parties…” (Neu et
al., 1998, p.265). How organizations manage their legitimacy has been and still is, an
interest of academic inquiries (e. g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Lindbolm 1994 and Suchman, 1995), and many
inquiries have applied or extended the legitimation strategies forwarded by Dowling and
Pfeffer (1975).
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) state that organizations have three basic methods
available to manage their legitimacy: (1) the organizations can modify their goals,
methods of operation, and performance in conformity with the prevailing definitions of
legitimacy, (2) the organizations can attempt to alter the definitions of social legitimacy
to the extent that social expectation is congruent with the current practices of the
organization, and (3) the organizations can make an effort to identify or associate
themselves with symbols, values, or institutions that have a strong perceived image of
social legitimacy. The implementation of a conformity strategy is relevant to
institutionalization and as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) note, this process of legitimation
leads to institutional isomorphism.
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Conversely, instead of actually changing the ways organizations are conducted,
the organization might choose the strategy of ceremonial conformity (Meyer and Rowan,
1977). Organizations might adopt certain highly visible and relevant practices that are
consistent with social expectations while leaving the essential operations of the
organization intact. This legitimation strategy is enacted only for its symbolic quality.
From the management perspective, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) are concerned with the
effect of legitimation and argue organizations run the risk of “protesting too much” if
legitimation actions are taken only based on organizations’ self evaluation of their
legitimacy status. The differences between corporate manager’s understanding of their
legitimacy status and the expectations of those who confer the status are called
“legitimacy gaps” (Sethi, 1979).
Wartick and Mahon (1994) suggest that legitimacy gaps may arise for several
reasons. First, corporate performance changes while societal expectations of corporate
performance remain the same, or societal expectations of corporate performances change
while corporate performance remains the same. In this situation, what was once
acceptable corporate practice becomes problematic. Second, both corporate performance
and societal expectations may change, but they either move in different directions, or
they move in the same direction but with a time lag. In addition, empirical evidence also
shows the reputation or legitimacy of the organization, or the industry would be
threatened if particular external or internal adverse social or environmental events
occurred (Patten, 1992, Deegan et al., 2000).
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Lindblom (1994) applied Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) legitimation strategies to
investigate the function of corporate social and environmental disclosure. She suggests
that in addition to actual change in organizational practices, change in the perceptions and
expectations of those who confer legitimacy, firms can also manipulate perception by
deflecting attention from the issue of concern to other related issues of strength. For
instance, corporations may emphasize their philanthropic actions (Williams, and Barrett,
2000) and pollution control initiatives (Patten, 2005) in their reports and downplay their
records of workforce reduction or EPA violations.
Prior work in accounting research demonstrates that firms tend to use social and
environmental disclosures as a strategic tool to manage their relevant stakeholders
(Ullmann, 1985; Roberts, 1992; Neu et al., 1998) and symbolically repair their legitimacy
(Patten, 2005). There are several concerns associated with such a practice. First,
environmental disclosure information not only lacks value, it can be purposely
misleading (Deegan, 2002; Patten, 2005). Second, managers may provide corporate
social responsibility information as a method to manipulate their stakeholders, not to
meet societal expectation for accountability. This manipulative practice could lead to
unjustified resource allocations and eventually jeopardize social progress (Puxty, 1991)
because the public may wrongfully reward resources to organizations that indeed should
be penalized for their illusive behaviors.
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Corporate charitable contributions and legitimation

Social and environmental disclosure, however, is only one of many potential tools
that firms can use to manage their legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002). Corporate charitable
contributions have been theorized as an important legitimation strategy used by
corporations. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), Dowling and Pfeffer, (1975) and others, state
that charitable contributions are a form of legitimating behavior, and the amount of
contributions would be expected to vary over contexts or over time to the extent that
legitimacy is more or less problematic. This theorization is consistent with
environmental disclosure research findings; firms that have a poor environmental
performance record tend to disclose more than their better performing counterparts(Patten,
2002). If corporate charitable contributions and environmental disclosure are both
legitimation strategies, firms that have problems with their social and environmental
practices are theorized to use their charitable contributions as an attention deflecting tool
to redirect concern away from the issues (Lindblom, 1994), and attempt to minimize the
negative effect on their legitimacy. Thus, in contrast with the corporate social
responsibilities perspective (Carroll, 1979; 1991), if business entities using charitable
contributions to manage their legitimacy status, their contributions could be increased
when their legitimacy is in question. Firm legitimacy becomes problematic when firms
have poor employee relations, environmental troubles and product safety issues (Rhebein,
Waddock, and Graves, 2004).

68

Hypotheses

Employee relations. Employees are vitally important primary stakeholders.
Research findings indicate that firms that have good relationship with their employees are
rewarded with higher productivity and better financial performance (e. g. Becker and
Gerhart, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Huselid et al., 1997; O’Reilly and Pfeffer, 2000).
Managers are believed to be generally cautious in their employee practices. However,
management decisions such as layoffs and the underfunding of employee pension plans
may not only jeopardize employee relations but also turn business choices into significant
social issues. Cascio et al.(1997) and Palliam and Shalhoub (2002) document that the
expected positive economic results of downsizing are often elusive. Moreover, the public
expects corporations not only to be responsible to stockholders, but also to employees
and the society in which they are a part (WBCSD, 2005). Layoffs and underfunding
employees’ pensions penalize society by shifting the economic burden from business
entities to the public, and as a result, corporate legitimacy is threatened. In addition,
Zyglidopoulos (2004) reports that corporate legitimacy is especially questioned when
firms are financially sound prior to downsizing. These types of management decisions
attract public attention, for instance, the case of AT&T was discussed on the Public
Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) Newshour (PBS, 1996). According to Lindblom’s (1994)
attention deflecting strategy then, firms that have poor employee relations would be more
likely to make charitable donations than firms that have better employee relations. Thus,
the following hypothesis is postulated.
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H2a: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and
firm-specific problems with employee relations are positively related.

Environmental concerns. Prior accounting research provides evidence that
legitimation is one primary motivation for firms’ environmental disclosures (e.g. Deegan
et al., 1996; Patten, 1992, 2002; Neu et al., 1998). Patten (2002) documents that
corporations which have poor environmental performance tend to make more extensive
mitigating environmental disclosures than their better performing counterparts. In
addition to using environmental reporting as a legitimation instrument, corporations can
also use their charitable contributions as a complementary means to repair their
legitimacy. Williams and Barrett (2000), for instance, examine the influence of corporate
charitable giving programs on the link between the number of EPA and OSHA violations
committed by a firm and its public image. The results indicate that although a firm’s
public image can be diminished through its violation of environmental and labor
regulations, the extent of the decline in public image is reduced through charitable giving.
Charitable contributions appear to offer corporations a partial remedy for repairing their
legitimacy. Thus, the following hypothesis is offered.

H2b: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and
firm-specific problems with environmental issues are positively related.
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Product safety. Thousands of products are manufactured and used by consumers
every year. The public in general expects and relies on business corporations to
manufacture, import, and transfer safe products. However, each year many products such
as furniture, appliances, children’s products, drugs and even foods are recalled,
withdrawn or regarded unsafe. Product safety is not only a business concern but also a
societal issue. Unsafe or faulty products can create danger and cause injuries. For
instance, the CPSC (2005) reports that more than two hundred thousand (206,500) toyrelated injuries were treated in U. S. hospital emergency rooms in 2003. The government
agencies such as CPSC and FDA publicize the recall of a harmful or defective product on
their websites when they believe the public needs to be alerted about a serious hazard.
The publicity of such events damages corporate legitimacy. In addition to removing
unsafe products from the market, to compensate harmed individuals, corporations are
theorized to use their charitable contributions as a means to partially mitigate their
legitimacy loss.

H2c: The amount of corporate charitable contributions and
firm-specific problems with product safety are positively related.

Method and Research Design

I test the hypotheses by developing an empirical model of corporate charitable
contribution. The model is based on prior research concerning the determinants of
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corporate charitable contribution. The data sources and analyses used to test each
hypothesis are discussed below.
The overall empirical form of the model is stated as:

ChaContit = a1 + b1(EmpRelit) + b2(Envit) + b3(ProSafit) + b4(IndClait ) +
b5(Sizeit ) + b6(Profit ) + b7(AdvExpit ) + b8(Ageit )

where
ChaContit

= the charitable contributions by firm i in period t,

EmpRelit

= the KLD employee relations concern score for firm i in period t,

Envit

= the KLD environmental concern score for firm i in period t,

ProSafit

= the KLD product safety concern score for firm i in period t,

IndClait

= the industry classification for firm i in period t,

Sizeit

= the total assets for firm i in period t,

Profit

= the net income for firm i in period t,

AdvExpit

= the advertisement expenses by firm i in period t,

Ageit

= the age of firm i at period t.

The function of the charitable contribution model will be tested using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression with group dummy variables. The results of Hausman
tests will determine the best model for the data set. If the empirical results of test
variables are significant with negative signs, then Carroll’s (1979) conceptual framework
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of corporate social performance is supported. On the other hand, if the results of test
variables are significant but with positive sign, then Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975)’s
legitimation proposition is confirmed.

Dependent variable

Charitable contributions. Each firm’s total amount of charitable contributions
during 1998-2000 were obtained from the Corporate Giving Directory (2003), the
Directory of Corporate and Foundation Givers (2000) and Tax Returns of private
foundations (990-PF). Both cash gifts (including direct giving and donation to corporate
sponsored foundations) and gifts in-kind (if applicable) were added during the period.
The resulting figures (in millions) are used as the dependent variable in the current study.

Test variables

Corporate social performance variables are obtained from the social research firm
Kinder, Lydengerg, Domini’s (KLD) Socrates database3. Although several other
corporate social performance reports are available, the numbers of companies or the
dimensions of corporate social performance covered by these reports are limited. On the
other hand, KLD data offer several desirable qualities. KLD has quantifiable social
records of over 3,000 publicly traded U.S. companies across a range of dimensions

3

Socrates is a proprietary database program issued by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & CO. Inc. that provides
access to KLD’s ratings and other data pertaining to the social records of over 3,000 publicly traded U. S.
companies.
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pertaining to business related social concerns. Moreover, KLD’s data have been used
extensively in a growing body of largely management-based U.S. research on corporate
social performance issues (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997a, 1997b; Griffin and Mahon,
1997; Agle et al., 1999; Berman et al., 1999; Greening and Turban, 2000; Hillman and
Keim, 2001; Ruf et al., 2001; Waddock, 2003; Rehbein et al., 2004), and recently have
also been applied in accounting research (e.g. Cho, Patten and Roberts, 2005). Most
importantly, these data have been validated as the best currently available measurements
of corporate social performance (Sharfman, 1996; Szwajkowski and Figlewicz, 1999). A
complete and detailed description of the KLD rating system is available from Waddock
and Graves (1997a, 1997b) and KLD’s website (www.kld.com).
The test variables used in the current study are KLD’s corporate performance
rating for the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P) largest companies and another 150 publicly
traded companies that are also included in the index. KLD separately assigns strengths
and concerns across eight social performance dimensions. These dimensions are
community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human
rights, product, and others (KLD, 2003). Among these different dimensions, three
measurements (employee relations, environment, and product safety) are relevant to and
thus selected for the current study.
Employee relations. KLD analyzes corporate employee relations’ strengths and
concerns based on an extensive evaluation of each company’s union relations, labor
policy, employee benefit, employee involvement, and compliance with labor related
regulations. High strength ratings are assigned to companies that (1) have strong history
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of union relations; (2) have cash profit distributions or stock options available to the
majority of their employees; and (3) have a strong retirement benefit program. On the
other hand, high concern ratings are given to firms that (1) have a poor history of union
relations; (2) have records of employee health and safety standards violations; (3) have
reduced their workforce by 15% in the most recent year or by 25% during the past two
years or have announcement of such reduction; and (4) have either underfunded pension
or inadequate retirement benefits.
Environment performance. KLD assesses corporate environmental performance
strengths and concerns based on the following criteria. Firms are given high strength
ratings when they have excellent environmental planning, environmental impact
minimizing procedures, or they take initiative to use environmentally-friendly natural
resources. In contrast, high concern ratings are assigned to companies that have poor
environmental law and regulations compliance records, a significant portion of their
revenues generated from products or services that have negative environmental
consequences, or have failed to keep up with industry-wide environmental preventive
standards.
Product safety. Firms are given product strength ratings when they have national
recognized quality programs or have provided products or services for the economically
disadvantaged, or they are industry leaders for research and development. Conversely,
companies are assigned high product concern ratings when they have recently been
involved in controversies or regulatory actions pertaining to the safety of their products
and services, or when they have accusations regarding advertising practices, consumer
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fraud, or antitrust.
KLD assigns a score of zero, one, or two for each of the strength and concern
areas. Because this study focuses on how corporate executives rationalize their
philanthropic behavior while the firms have problems with employee relationships,
product safety and environmental performance; the sum of each concern rating for the
above three areas are used as the measurements for the independent variables. This is
consistent with the study of Cho et al. (2005), as they investigate the relationship between
the extent of firms’ environmental concerns and the amount of their political
expenditures.

Control variables

Findings of prior studies in corporate social performance and charitable
contributions have found significant relationships between industry classification,
company size, profitability, advertisement expense, the age of a company and corporate
donations. Accordingly, these variables should be controlled for in empirical tests. All
control variable data are obtained from Compustat, except for industry classification and
age.
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Table 2-1 Descriptions of Variables
Variable name
(expected sign)
Dependent variable
ChaCont (n a.)

Test variables
Employee relations
EmpRel (+/-)
Environmental
performance
Env (+/-)
Product safety
ProSaf(+/-)
Control variables
Industry classification
IndCla (+)

Company size
Size(+)
Profitability
Prof (+)
Adver. expense
AdvExp(+)
Age(+)

Description

Data source

Charitable contributions of firm
1998-2000

Corporate Giving Directory,
Directory of Corporate and
Foundation givers, and
Returns of Private
Foundation (990-PF)

Evaluation of employee relations
concern scores 1998-2000
Evaluation of environmental
concern scores 1998-2000

KLD
KLD

Evaluation of product safety
concern scores 1998-2000

KLD

IndCla =1 if firms in industries
that rely more on consumer sales,
public perceptions or are labor
intensive, else IndCla = 0
Natural log of assets
1998-2000
Return on assets of firm
1998-2000
Advertising and promotion
expense of firm 1998-2000
Age of firm in 2000

Standard Industrial
Classification Code

Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Mergent online

Industry classification. Prior studies have found some systematic relations
between broad industry characteristics and corporate social responsibility activities and
contributions. Industry differences have been shown to be significantly related to a
company’s social responsibility practices. Roberts (1992) documents that firms in the
industries that have a high level of political risk and concentrated intense competition
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have higher levels of social responsibility disclosures. For this current study,
environmentally sensitive firms are more likely to have environmental issues than
service-oriented companies. Product safety concerns are more relevant to manufacturing
corporations than to merchandising or servicing firms. For charitable contributions, firms
in industries that rely more on consumer sales (Burt, 1983), public perceptions (Clotfelter,
1985), or are more labor intensive (Navarro, 1988) tend to donate more. Based on
Standard Industrial classification (SIC) code and numbers of employees, if a sample
firms is identified with one of the above three industries, the variable IndCla is set equal
to one; else IndCla is set equal to zero.
Company size. Company size has been shown to correlate with charitable
contributions (McElroy, and Siegfried, 1985). Firm size creates social and political
exposures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Miles, 1987), and as a result, larger firms have
a higher level of visibility to the general public and the government as well as to grantseeking organizations. In addition, larger firms are also more likely to institutionalize
their charitable giving programs via corporate sponsored foundations (Webb, 1992;
Werbel and Carter, 2002). In this study, the natural log of assets is used as a control
variable for firm size.
Profitability. Profitability might also create social and political exposures. In
addition, charitable giving is related to profits because firms time their donations as a
means to reduce their taxable income (Webb, 1994). Another reason why donations are
tied to profitability is because many firms used a fixed percentage of pretax net income to
decide the amount of their donations (McElroy and Siegfried, 1986). Return on assets is
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used to control for the potential effect of profitability on the amount of charitable
contributions.
Advertising expense. Research has also found significant positive correlations
between advertising expense and charitable contributions (Fry et al., 1982; Navarro,
1988). These studies posited that contributions and advertisements are both vehicles used
by corporations to negotiate favorable corporate images with different audiences. To
control for the effect, the amount of advertising and promotion expenses (in millions) for
each year is included.
The age of a company. Consistent with Roberts (1992), the maturity of a firm
may affect its social responsibility activities because as a firm matures, its reputation and
history of involvement with nonprofit and charitable organizations can become
entrenched. For instance, the Ford Motor Foundation has a history of supporting
museums and arts. Mature corporations are more likely to have long-term sponsorships
with nonprofit organizations and charities. The age of each corporation in 2000 is
included as a control variable.

Sample selection and description

Corporations selected to examine the function of corporate charitable contribution
in this study had to meet three criteria: (1) they had to be included in Kinder, Lydenberg,
Domini, Inc. ratings for corporate social performance during 1998 to 2000; (2) they had
to be listed on the Corporate Giving Directory and /or the Directory of Corporate and
Foundation Givers during 1998 to 2000, and (3) they were included in Compustat for the
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period. The data available for years 1998 to 2000 for a total of 384 firms were collected
and formed a longitudinal cross sectional (panel) data set of 1152 observations4. Table 22 summaries several attributes of the sample firms.
Table 2-2 Summary of the Sample Firms’ Attributes
Fortune 500
Sponsoring corporate foundations
Product/equipment donations
In-kind services
Consumer sales/ public perception oriented
N= 1152

Yes
198 (52%)
285 (74%)
177 (46%)
150 (39%)
175 (46%)

No
186 (48%)
99 (26%)
207 (54%)
234 (61%)
209 (54%)

Among the 384 sample firms, 198 (52%) are Fortune 500 corporations; 285
(74%) fund company foundations; 177 donate products or equipment; 150 (39%) provide
in-kind services, and 175 (46) rely more on consumer sales or public perceptions.
Table 2-3
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Charitable Contribution Empirical Tests
Variables

Mini

Maxi

Mean

Standard Deviation

ChaConta
0.00b
624.61
10.88
38.83
EmpRel
0
3
0.28
0.51
Env
0
5
0.46
0.89
ProSaf
0
4
0.46
0.78
IndCla
na
na
na
na
Size (ln)
3.55
13.71
8.79
1.60
Prof
-39.05
49.85
5.83
6.26
AdvExp
1
4,500
457.58
734.95
Age
1
209
62.09
43.51
N = 1152 except AdvExp N=341
a. See table 2-1 for a complete description of the variables.
b. Figures for Size and AdvExp are in millions.

4

Missing data are included in the final analysis because the test results of including missing data and
excluding missing data are similar.
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Table 2-3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables. The average amount
of charitable contributions is $10.88 million, with a range of less than $1 million (low) to
$624.61 million (high). The average KLD employee relation concern score is 0.28, with
a range of 0 to 3. The average KLD concern scores of environmental performance and
product safety are both 0.46, with the low concern scores of zero for both categories and
high concern scores of 5 and 4 for environmental performance and product safety
respectively. The mean natural log of assets is $8.79 millions, with a range of $3.55
millions (low) to $13.71 (high) millions. The average ratio of return on assets is 5.83,
with the low ratio of –39,05 to the high ratio of 49.85. The average amount of
advertising expense is $457.58 millions, with a range from $1 million (low) to $4,500
millions (high). The average age of firms is 62.09, with a range from 1 to 209.

Analysis of the Results
I first performed correlation analyses between variables. Table 2-4 presents the
bivariate correlations between the amount of charitable contribution and the KLD
evaluation concern scores of employee relation, environmental performance, product
safety and control variables. All bivariate correlations between dependent and the control
variables possess the expected sign and are all significantly correlated (at the 0.01 level).
Correlations between independent variables show no indication that any unacceptable
levels of multicollinearity (above 0.8 or 0.9) are present in the data.
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Table 2-4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

a

1. ChaCont
2. EmpRel
-0.01
3. Env
0.12** 0.10**
4. ProSaf
0.34** 0.15**
0.30**
5. IndCla
0.26** -0.02
0.01
0.24**
6. Size
0.30** 0.03
0.24*
0.37** 0.42**
7. Prof
0.17** -0.11** -0.11** -0.01
0.11** -0.21**
8. Age
0.10** -0.03
0.10**
0.07*
0.07*
0.02
a. See table 2-1 for a complete description of the variables.
AdvExp is not included in the final analysis because of data limitation.
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

0.09**

The function of the charitable contribution model was first tested using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression with group dummy variables, which is an appropriated
analytical procedure for panel data, but one problem emerged. The analytical procedure
was unable to execute because the advertising data was insufficient. As a result, the
control variable of AdvExp variable dropped off the model5. The function of charitable
contribution was then tested, and Hausman test results indicate that random model best
represents the data set. The test results of the random model are presented in Table 2-5.

5

The test results of the 341 observations with advertising expense variable are similar to the results without
the variable.
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Table 2-5
Regression Results of the Function of Charitable Contribution Test
Dependent variable = charitable contributions of firms for 1998-2000
Expected sign
Random Model
Parameter
Standard
estimates
error
Cont. vars
IndCla
+
9.511
3.60
Size
+
4.554
1.096
Prof
+
0.363
0.146
Age
+
0.057
0.037
Test vars.
EmpRel
+/-0.831
1.776
Env
+/3.208
1.403
ProSaf
+/10.275
1.663
Model Statistics
Model
F-statistic = 12.56
Sig.
Sig. at the 0.000 level
R-squared
Adjusted R2 = 0.80
a. Significance levels are two-tailed.

Sig.a

0.008
0.000
0.012
0.129
0.640
0.022
0.000

The random model is significant at the 0.000 level with a F score statistic of 12.56,
and the adjusted coefficient of correlation (R2) is 0.80. All four control variables (IndCla,
Size, Prof, and Age) possess the expected signs. Both IndCla and Size are significant at
the 0.000 level, and Prof is at 0.10 level. Age is not significant. EmpRel has a negative
sign but is not significant. Both Env and ProSaf have a positive sign and are significant
at the 0.05 and 0.000 level, respectively. The overall results confirm that corporate
charitable contributions are corporate legitimation actions. More specifically, the
empirical evidence supports H2b and H2c, which posit that the amount of corporate
charitable contributions is positively associated with firm’s KLD evaluation concern
scores for firms’ environmental performance and product safety ratings.
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Discussion of Research Findings
The findings of this empirical test are of interest to academia as well as to many
stakeholders. The significance of the empirical results provides evidence that corporate
charitable contributions are a means of legitimation as theorized by Dowling and Pfeffer
(1975) rather than a representation of corporate social performance as postulated by
Carroll (1979; 1991). From a legitimacy perspective, Dowling and Peffer (1975) argue
that the amount of corporate contributions would be expected to vary over time or
contexts when firm’s legitimacy is more or less problematic. On the other hand, driven
by economic factors, Carroll (1979; 1991) posits that business managers would allocate
more resources to improve their economic performance and fewer funds to be donated to
charities. The significance of both Env and ProSafe with a positive sign is consistent
with the finding of environmental disclosure research; firms that have a poor evaluation
of environmental performance or product safety issues tend to donate more. Thus, in
addition to environmental disclosure as documented by Patten (1992; 2005), corporations
also use charitable donations as a tool of legitimation.
The lack of significance for the employee relation variable does not support the
hypothesis that firms donate more resource to manage their poorer employee relations.
This finding could be explained by distinguishing internal and external factors.
Employee relation may be considered as an internal factor rather than an external issue
such as environmental performance and product safety evaluation. Corporate charitable
contributions are generally a channel between the corporation and external parties, which
may not be an ideal instrument for managing internal issues such as employee relations.
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Implication of Research Results
The empirical evidence provided by this study has several important public policy
applications. Corporate charitable donations are a means of legitimation and not an
indicator of corporate social friendliness, thus the perceived merit of corporate donation
appears to be misleading. Discoursing only the amount of charitable contributions within
business financial statement, as currently proposed by the U. S. Congress, may convey an
inaccurate corporate social performance message to the public. In order for business
entities to be socially responsible and accounted for their overall performance, as
suggested by Gray et al. (1997) and others, corporations should report their financial,
social, and environmental performances simultaneously in one statement. By so doing,
the public may have adequate information to evaluate or observe the performance of
corporations.
In addition to business reporting issues, the public may want to reconsider the tax
deduction policy regarding corporate charitable contributions. Tax deduction of
corporate donations is intended to encourage business entities to share their resources
with the society. However, as evidenced by this the results of this study, corporations
donate resources not to be socially accountable but to attempt to purchase their social
legitimacy, and such legitimation action is partially subsidized by the public via tax
deduction.
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Conclusions and Limitations

The objective of this study was to empirically test whether corporate charitable
contributions are an indicator of corporate social performance as theorized by Carroll
(1979; 1991) and Wood (1991) or corporate legitimation action as theorized by Dowling
and Pfeffer (1975). The results of this study provide strong empirical evidence that
charitable contribution is a legitimation tool used by corporation in managing their social
legitimacy. Firms that have a poorer environmental or product safety evaluation score
tend to donate more than firms that receive a better evaluation score in these two domains.
This finding confirms that legitimacy theory is an appropriate lens for analyses of
corporate donation and that factors other than economic performance are important in
social and environmental accounting research. The study results also suggest that a
concurrent business statement of corporate financial, social and environmental
performance would be an appropriate reporting approach.
Several future research suggestions emerged from the results of this study. First,
the relationship between corporate charitable contribution and other dimensions of
corporate performance could be tested. In addition to environmental performance and
product safety issue, corporate governance structure, composition of the board, and
community relation are also important aspects of corporate social performance. This
study could also be replicated using other social performance evaluation ratings. Finally,
identification of the recipients of corporate donation could verify the intention and
effectiveness of such legitimation action.
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The findings of this study are subject to several limitations. First, the amount of
direct giving, product donations, and in-kind service are self reported, which may not be
accurate. Second, there is no commonly acceptable value standard for in-kind services.
Finally, the empirical tests were performed on large U. S. public corporations that may
restrict the generalizability of the study results.
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STUDY THREE
CURRENT TAX LAWS AND THE FULFULLMENT OF CORPORATE
FOUNDATIONS’ SOCIAL FUNCTIONS:
EVIDENCE FROM 990-RETURNS OF PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
Introduction
During the twentieth century, United States (U. S.) public policy regarding
corporate managers’ rights to authorize charitable donations of corporate resources has
come full circle. At the beginning of the century, corporate managers were not allowed
to make any charitable donations because many court rulings stated that giving business
resources away without anything in return was beyond the power of management
(Bormann, 1994). Currently, however, every state’s corporation statute grants businesses
the right to make donations1 (Balotti and Hanks, 1999; Kahn, 1997). At present,
corporations may deduct charitable donations (including giving to their sponsored
foundations) up to 10 percent of their annual modified taxable income (Internal Revenue
Code Section 170 (b)(2)).
Due in part to this favorable tax treatment, business corporations are believed to
be more proactive in managing their charitable giving agenda and attempt to directly
control the amounts, recipients, and timing of their contributions (Werbel and Carter,
2002; Jones, 1994). Many corporations use corporate (company-sponsored) foundations

1

Currently, every state and the District of Columbia have a statute enabling its corporations to make
charitable donations. Although the language used by different philanthropy statutes may vary slightly,
these statutes are generally unrestrictive as to the amount of the contributions and its beneficiaries. Also,
these statutes do not define who within the corporation has decision-making power over corporate
charitable contributions.
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to handle some or all of their donations (Himmelstein, 1997). A corporate foundation is a
tax-exempt private foundation that receives its funds from a profit-seeking business
corporation, but is legally separate from its sponsoring company.
The number of corporate foundations has increased 26% from 2,018 in 2000 to
2,549 in 2003. The amount of funds distributed by corporate foundations has also
increased 15 % from $3.02 to $3.47 billion in 2000 and 2003 respectively. However, the
amount of assets possessed by these foundations has decreased from $16 billion in 2000
to $15.5 billion in 2003 (Atienza, 2005). Using a foundation as a giving vehicle seems to
be a trend of many business entities.
Corporate foundations’ funds are partially subsidized through tax deductions.2 In
addition, tax provisions for private foundations, in comparison to tax provisions for
corporations, provide many economic advantages. For instance, the current excise tax
rate on a foundation’s investment income is only 2%, while the top corporate rate is
35%.3 These favorable tax treatments imply that the society at large believes foundation
funds are used for the public interest.
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, this study investigates the relationship
between the current tax laws and the fulfillment of corporate foundations’ social
functions. Theoretically, private foundations are expected to fund leading research that
may bring alternative solutions to social issues (Andrews, 1965; Zurcher, 1972; Heifetz,
et al., 2004). Current tax laws, however, neither distinguish the functions between

2

Internal Revenue Code Sections 170 and 503(c)(3).
Internal Revenue Code Sections 509(a) and 4941. The provision of the 1969 Tax Reform Act imposed an
excise tax of 4% on the income a foundation derives from investment, but the current excise tax rate is
generally around 2%.
3
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private foundations and charities nor require or provide any incentive for foundations to
fund research. This lack of differentiation is an important public policy issue because if
current tax laws do not facilitate foundations to fulfill their social functions, amendments
to tax provisions for private foundations appear to be needed. Second, this study
examines whether the giving behavior of corporate foundations is motivated primarily by
the tax advantage or by a desire to strategically manage their parent company’s business
environment.
This study contributes to both the accounting and nonprofit organization literature
because existing corporate foundation research has concentrated only on sponsoring
corporations (Webb, 1992; Werbel and Carter, 2002) with little or no consideration on
the payout behaviors of corporate foundations. Corporate foundations’ payout behaviors
are important because the size of their endowment, donations and contributions are
substantial (Atienza, 2005; Stencel, 1998), and most importantly, private foundations
have specified social functions to fulfill.
The data collected and analyzed in this study are not based on perception or
estimation but on the actual activities of corporate foundations. Although previous
studies (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Navarro, 1988; Wokutch and Spencer, 1987; Kedia
and Kuntz, 1981; Levy and Shatto, 1980) have attempted to investigate corporations’
charitable giving activities, obtaining an accurate measurement of business’s direct and
in-kind giving has been extremely difficult. Achieving correct measurement is difficult
for two reasons. First, neither the current state corporation law nor the federal securities
regulations require companies to disclose their direct charitable spending and services
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(Brudney and Ferrell, 2002; Kahn, 1997). Second, even if they report the amount of
giving voluntarily, there are no agreed-upon standards for valuing gifts of in-kind goods
and services.
Unlike direct giving and in-kind donation, the actual charitable activities of
company-sponsored foundations are publicly available from their tax returns filed
annually with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The institutionalized charitable
activities undertaken by a corporate foundation are likely to reflect the social and political
interests of its sponsoring corporation (Heald, 1970; Himmelstein, 1997; Kroll, 1991;
Troy, 1982). As a result, the data collected from corporate foundations are considered
the best measure currently available to examine corporations’ charitable giving behaviors.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. The next section begins with a
brief review of the legal history of corporate charitable giving and company-sponsored
foundations. Thereafter, the social functions of foundations and charitable organizations
are discussed and the first hypothesis is presented. Following that, two theoretically
grounded motivations for corporate foundation giving are reviewed. The two motivations
are the tax advantage hypothesis and the strategic management hypothesis. These
hypotheses are then empirically tested. Finally, the findings and implications for research
and public policy are presented.

Legal History and Tax Policies Related to Corporate Donations
The legal history regarding corporate donations in the U. S. reveals substantial
changes in public policy. Until the early 1950s, it was beyond the power of corporate
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managers to make any charitable donation from which the company did not directly
benefit (Werbel and Carter, 2002). However, in 1953, in A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co.
v. Barlow, et al., the New Jersey Superior Court judge stated that under common law
every corporation has the right and a duty to make charitable giving. As a result, the
“beyond the power” policy was overruled.
Additionally, in 1955, the court ruling of the Union Pacific Railroad case
discarded the direct benefit rule pertaining to corporate donations. The judge stated that
whether or not certain business actions directly benefit the company should be
determined by the executives because they knew better than the judge what was in the
firm’s best interest (Webb, 1992; Werbel and Carter, 2002). As a result, many state
statutes regarding business donations were amended.
Currently, a business corporation may deduct charitable donations up to 10
percent of the corporation’s modified taxable income for the year when given to any
domestic 501(c)(3) organization including donations to its sponsored foundations.4 Any
charitable donation that is not currently deductible due to the percentage limitation may
be carried over for up to five years.5 In other words, under the current charitable tax
provisions, the government is willing to subsidize business’ charitable giving through tax
deduction. For instance, given a corporate tax rate of 35%, within the $3.3 billion of

4

In 1935, the Internal Revenue Code was amended to permit charitable deduction in an amount not to
exceed 5% of a firm’s taxable income, and currently the deductibility of gifts is up to 10 % of the
corporation’s annual adjusted gross income (Internal Revenue Code sections 170(b)(2) was modified in
1981.)
5
Internal Revenue Code Section 170(c)(2).
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grant money given by corporations to their sponsored foundations in 2003 (Atienza,
2005), approximately $1.2 billion is subsidized by the public through tax deduction.
An additional amount of tax reduction is given by the tax treatments available to
private foundations. Company-sponsored foundations held approximately $16 billion in
assets in 2003 (Atienza, 2005). The excise taxes on the return on these assets were
generally 2 percent 6, which is substantially lower than the taxes (35 percent) on identical
returns to for-profit business entities. Moreover, corporate foundations are required to
pay out only 5% of its asset value for charitable purposes each year, and grants as well as
administrative expenses are included in this minimum payout amount.7 Because of these
tax advantages, business corporations appear to be more proactive in managing their
giving programs (Mescon and Tillson, 1987). Many corporations use their own
foundations to maintain control over the amounts, recipients, and timing of their
contributions (Werbel and Carter, 2002; Himmelstein, 1997; Jones, 1994).
The current study is designed to test two hypotheses. First, this study examines
whether the current public policy, as evidenced by Internal Revenue Code Section 170;
503(c)(3) and 4942, facilitates or hinders corporate foundations from fulfilling their
social functions. Theoretically, the distinct function of private foundations is supposed to
fund leading research that may provide alternative solutions to social issues (Andrews,
1965; Zurcher, 1972; Heifetz, et al., 2004). Second, by examining the payout activities

6

Internal Revenue Code Sections 509(a) and 4941. The provision of the 1969 Tax Reform Act imposed an
excise tax of 4% on the income a foundation derives from investment, but the current excise tax rate is
generally 2%, and some foundations may be qualified for a reduced excise tax rate of 1%.
7
Internal Revenue Code Section 4942. The pay-out requirement requires foundations to pay out 5% of its
asset value (including grants, and necessary and reasonable administrative expenses) for charitable purpose
each year, and the Secretary of the Treasury has authority to change the rate using a formula.
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of corporate foundations, this study analyzes whether tax advantage or strategic
management is the main incentive for foundations’ giving. The literature of economics,
management, nonprofit organizations and political science on corporate foundations
suggests two possible rationales for businesses to establish foundations as their giving
vehicle--tax advantage (Clotfelter, 1985; Heald, 1970; Webb, 1992; Webb, 1996) and
strategic management of corporate environment (Bormann, 1994; Webb, 1992; Werbel
and Carter, 2002; White and Bartolomeo, 1980; Zurcher, 1972). However, the previous
empirical work attempting to test these different motivations is by no means conclusive.

Theoretical Development and Research Questions
Justification of Private Foundations

Roelofs (2003) states that the political system of a democratic capitalistic society,
such as the United States, is maintained in two ways: the state and the civil society. The
former controls through force and laws and is complemented by the latter that produces
consent without resort to force. Nonprofit organizations are theorized to be critical to the
effective functioning of a nation that has a strong economic market and, comparatively, a
weak state. Hansmann (1980, 1981) argues that the economic, production and related
tasks performed by the business and commercial world are primarily governed by the
market through a contractual agreement. Private nonprofit organizations such as
foundations, however, are a response to market failure. For instance, when the
purchasers and the recipients of the goods or service are separated and especially when
the recipients are unknown to the purchasers, the purchasers are in a poor position to
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determine whether the goods or services they pay for are in fact ever delivered or
performed. In this situation, the purchasers would prefer to rely on a nonprofit entity
than to contract with a business organization because profit-seeking business is assumed
to have a relatively strong incentive to skimp on the services it promises and to divert
most or all of its revenue directly to its owners (Gunn, 2004).
In addition, the concept of market failure also helps to explain the prevalence of
nonprofits as private-market producers of certain specific goods such as public,
charitable, and certain mixed services. Abzug and Webb (1999) state the market failure
of public and similar goods occurs when the quantity of certain specific goods and
services, such as healthcare and insurance, provided by businesses is inadequate. This
occurs when business entities doubt that consumers have the ability to pay for the goods
and services they request, which leads to insufficient supply, and at the same time the
government fails to compensate. In these situations, nonprofits are theorized to be more
suitable for goods/service providers.
The Council on Foundations (1975) states that the justification of foundation and
charitable giving are both primarily based on three beliefs: (1) the importance of
encouraging voluntarism in the fulfilling of social needs; (2) the suitability of
decentralization of funding our educational, cultural, and charitable services; and (3) the
usefulness of having some alternatives to many government services, even when those
government services are accepted as the norm.
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Functional Differences between Foundations and Charities
Although private foundations are funded by charitable contributions, the social
expectation of a private foundation is somewhat different from traditional charities.
Roelofs (2003) states the distinction between foundation grant-making and charitable
giving is in the “root cause” metaphor. Whereas the purpose of traditional charities is to
provide relief to the poor, the distressed or the underprivileged, and to lessen the burdens
of government, the purpose of foundations is to do something about the deeper causes
that lead to suffering and inequality in the first place. For instance, the research on and
discovery of vaccine treatment is aimed at preventing the suffering that accompanies
epidemics. Furthermore, Andrews (1965, p.5) emphasizes that the purpose of
foundations “is not relief or even cure, it is prevention, research, and discovery.” Heifetz
et al. (2004) argue that if foundations are to achieve their social role, they are well
positioned to do so through imaginative and even controversial leadership. Society as a
whole anticipates foundations (with partially public subsidized endowments) will fund
innovative programs, leading research and work on the frontlines of social problems, and
hope these efforts would provide alternative solutions to social issues in which society
may progress (Zurcher, 1972).
Foundations also are supposed to be more flexible and adaptable to specific
situations and pressing social needs than governmental appropriation and governmental
agencies normally can be (Zurcher, 1972). Foundations, as independent legal entities, are
able to respond to new ideas, support freedom of thought, perform research, and even to
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critically review governmental programs and policies. Zurcher (1972, p.3) further
emphasizes:
It is particularly desirable to maintain an institution like the foundation
because, among private institutions concerned with public ends, the
foundation is peculiarly equipped to command the resources and the
freedom of action to provide alternatives to governmental policy and,
if it will, to take the lead in exploring new and uncharted directions
in which society might move. All this … makes for a more
open and a more enlightened society.

The function of private foundations differs from that of traditional charities.
Private foundations equipped with publicly subsidized financial resources and
administrative autonomy are expected to support research projects, institutions, and
scholars who investigate social problems and public policy issues (Zurcher, 1972).
However, corporate foundations, being funded by business, may prefer to associate with
charities rather than to be involved in social issues research or projects because many
prior studies (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Wood, 1990) suggest that corporate donations to
charities is usually perceived as a friendly corporate social activity. Moreover, Roberts
(1992) empirically verifies that the establishment of corporate foundations has had a
positive relationship with the parent company’s social responsibility disclosure level. In
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other words, corporations that use foundations as their donation vehicle are more
proactive in demonstrating that they are socially friendly entities.
On the other hand, funding activities concerning social and public policy issues
could be an extremely valuable social function of corporate foundations but it also could
expose the sponsoring corporations to unnecessary business risk. Mcilnay (1997, p. 26)
states:
Involvement in public policy is a two-edged sword for [corporate]
foundations: at once perhaps their single most substantive opportunity
for public service and their single greatest vulnerability to criticism.

Although corporate foundations are legally separated from the funding
organizations, the grant-making behaviors of foundations are likely to be influenced by
the giving policies and social interests of the parent company because foundations are
financially and administratively controlled by the sponsoring corporations (Heald, 1970;
Himmelstein, 1997; Kroll, 1991; Troy, 1982). In a capitalistic society, business entities
are believed to be more concerned with their economic benefits as long as the pursuits of
their business interest are within the provisions of laws. The current tax provisions
neither request nor provide any incentive for corporate foundations to support public
policy studies; grant monies given to traditional charities and policy research receives the
same tax treatment. Consequently, corporate foundations operating in a capitalistic
society are theorized to have a preference to provide funding to traditional charities rather
than social issue research. It is because funding traditional charities not only helps
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organizations enjoy the same degree of tax benefits, and perhaps the same amount of
name recognition, but also prevents many criticisms. Thus:

Hypothesis 1: Corporate sponsored foundations will give a significantly
higher amount of grant monies to traditional charities than they will give
to research and public policy studies.

Giving behavior of corporate foundations

Corporate foundations, as tax exempt private organizations, must follow the rules
prescribed by Section 509(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and the Tax Reform Act of
1969 (TRA69). These rules not only provide guidelines on whom are the legitimate grant
recipients but also set the annual minimum grants payout requirement. The minimum
payout rule is the amount that a foundation is required to expend for charitable purposes
including grants, and necessary and reasonable administrative expenses. In general, a
foundation is required to pay out at least 5 percent of the market value of its assets each
year.
The combination of charitable deduction tax provisions for corporate donations
and the minimum payout requirements for corporate foundations might lead to different
giving behavior of corporations and foundations. For instance, assume a company with a
marginal tax rate of 35% has $100 of net taxable income available for donation. The
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company has at least three legitimate options: (1) no donation; perhaps dividends, (2)
direct donation to charities, and (3) donation to its sponsored foundation. However, the
social consequences of these three corporate actions may be different.

Table 3-1
The Relationship Between Corporation Actions and the Net Resource Change to Society
No Donation
Keep $ 100
Resource Kept by the
Corporation
Amount paid in Taxes

$ 100 Donation
to Public
Charities

$ 100 Donations
to Its Own
Foundations

$65

$0

$0

$35

$0

$0

Resource Available to
Govern/Nonprofits
$35
$100
$ 5~100
Net Change of Fund to Society
Compared w/no charitable
$65
$ (30) ~ $65
donations
Assuming a company with a marginal tax rate of 35% has $100 of net taxable income
available for donation.

As indicated by table 3-1, the first option that the company can choose is to keep
and reinvest the net income in its business and pay an income tax of $35. As a result, the
company keeps $65, and $35 becomes tax revenue to the public, which is the primary
financial resource to support governmental functions. Second, the company can donate
the $100 directly to charity. This option results in an increase of $100 to charity and $35
of tax loss for the government, but the overall net public resource increase is $65 as
compared to the first option. This option could be considered the intent of the charitable
deduction provision. The government is willing to subsidize the tax revenue of $35 and
give the company the privilege to select the social cause it wishes to support as long as
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the company gives away the $100 to socially desirable organizations. In other words,
within the $100 donation, the company’s actually giving is $65 and the $35 is sponsored
by the public via tax deduction (or forgone in tax revenue).
Finally, instead of giving to other charities directly, the company can donate the
$100 to its own foundation and received a deduction of $35. Although the company
receives the same tax benefit regardless of whether it donates directly or through its
foundation, the actual resource available to the public may vary significantly. The
amount may vary because foundations are only required to give out a minimum of five
percent of its assets, which total $100 in this example. If only $5 of the $100 is given out
to socially desirable programs by the company-sponsored foundation, the public
temporarily experiences8 a deficit of $30 for this particular donation as compared to
option 1. It is because $35 of tax revenue is lost and only $5 of grant money is
distributed to the society. Through examining the giving behavior of corporate
foundations, we might be able to infer the purpose of using foundations as a means for
business charitable giving.

Giving motivations of corporate foundation

The literature suggests two possible rationales - tax advantage and strategic
management of corporate environment– that may explain why so many corporate
foundations come into being and persist indefinitely. Many researchers (Clotfelter, 1985;
Heald, 1970; Webb, 1992; Webb, 1996) argue the most important reasons for using a
8

Over time foundations have to payout the total amount of the particular donation.
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corporate foundation have to do with the tax code. First, funds donated by the company
for charitable purpose do not have to be handed over immediately to the ultimate users
but can be transferred to the foundations. Thus, companies can increase donations in
more profitable years to benefit from tax deduction and not immediately lose control of
the funds. Second, corporations can fund foundations with appreciated property and
foundations can turn around and sell the property and pay no capital gains tax on earnings.
Third, foundations’ funds can be distributed regularly to chosen recipients because the
payout requirement is only 5% of the asset.
If the characteristics of corporate foundations are similar to other nonprofit
organizations, tax benefit plays an important role in their reporting and giving behaviors.
For instance, Yetman (2001) documents that nonprofit organizations allocate expenses
from their tax-exempt to their taxable activities to reduce their tax liabilities. Moreover,
Sansing and Yetman (2002) find that large and professionally managed foundations have
a tendency to minimize their payouts. Thus, the tax advantage hypothesis is postulated:

Hypothesis 2a: The annual amount of contributions given by a corporate
foundation does not significantly exceed its minimum payout requirement.

Still, others (Neiheisel, 1994; Werbel and Carter, 2002; Williams and Barrett,
2000) argue that managing the sponsoring corporation’s business environment is the most
important reason to set up a corporate foundation. Neiheisel (1994) argues that
corporations use their foundation as an extended arm to administer their public affairs,
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which may reduce government interference and special interest group criticism. Werbel
and Carter (2002) find that CEO’s influence on corporate charitable contribution is
reduced when giving is administrated by corporate foundations. This control may in turn
reduce the pressure from stockholders who assume that corporate executives use
corporate giving for their personal gain rather than the benefit of the business.
Additionally, William and Barrett (2000) document that corporate charitable
giving mitigates unfavorable corporate reputations caused by environmental violations.
This conjecture is consistent with the findings of Study two, that corporate charitable
contribution is a legitimation action undertaken by business when their business practices
are in question. Corporations, therefore, use donations as the premium of social and
political insurance to “purchase” a favorable business environment that may help them
continue to survive.
To maintain a favorable business environment requires continuous efforts. As a
result, corporate foundations become an important strategic tool for corporations to
continually purchase their “social and political insurance” through stable charitable
giving even if company profits are unsound and available funds are limited (Hillman,
1965; Webb, 1992).
Moreover, as documented by the findings of Study Two of this dissertation,
corporations that receive poorer social performance evaluation scores tend to make more
donations then corporations that receive better evaluation scores. In order to control the
influence of their parent company’s legitimacy need in corporate foundation’s payout
behavior, the unfavorable social performance scores of a foundation’s sponsoring
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corporation should be accounted for. Thus, the strategic management hypothesis
suggests that:

Hypothesis 2b: The annual amount of contribution given by corporate
foundations significantly exceeds the minimum payout requirement after
controlling for the legitimacy need of the parent company.

The tax advantage hypothesis and the strategic management hypothesis
mentioned above are used to test the payout behavior of corporate foundations. This
study does not suggest that these two hypotheses are mutually exclusive. The purpose of
this examination is to identify, from the empirical results, the primary incentive of using
corporate foundations as a conduit for business donations.

Research Design
Sample and data collection

181 corporate foundations collected in the newest edition of Corporate
Foundation Profiles by the Foundation Center (Jones, 2002) are used as the sample
foundations. The data of these 181 foundations contained in the profiles are used to test
hypothesis 1. Corporate Foundation Profiles (Jones, 2002) provides information on
corporate foundations that gave at least $1 million in the year of 1998 or 1999. Each
profile includes foundation giving-interest areas, application guidelines, recently awarded
grants, information on the sponsoring company, types of support, international giving and
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others. Thus, the profiles provide standardized comparisons for corporate foundations’
giving across business companies, which are required to hypothesis 1. Corporate
foundations selected to test hypotheses 2a and 2b are primary based on the set of 181
foundations used to test hypothesis 1. However, in order to control for the legitimacy
needs of the sponsoring firms, the parent company of a foundation must also have
reported KLD social performance scores. There were 108 foundations that met the
criteria.
The amount of foundation giving and required minimum payout are obtained
from the annual tax returns filed by corporate foundations with the IRS in Form 990-PF
(Return of Private Foundation). The 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 requires tax-exempt
organizations to disclose their tax returns. Moreover, the IRS has agreed to provide the
optically scanned Form 990 (Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax) to
institutions such as The Foundation Center, Guide Star, and the National Center for
Charitable Statistics (NCCS), where return data are available to the general public.
Form 990-PF presents the basic financial statements of private foundations.
Although the report is financial in nature, other relevant information is also included (see
Appendix). For instance, Part I of Form 990-PF is an analysis of revenue and expenses:
the amount of all revenue, operating and administrative expenses are listed where the
total amount of contribution received and given are reported. Compensation of officers,
directors, trustees and key employees are stated. Part II and III contain detailed reports of
balance sheet items. Part IV reports capital gains or losses on investment income. Part V
provides detailed payout information for five previous years. Foundations use this
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information to determine whether they qualify for the reduced 1% tax on net investment
income. The payout information for the past five years and the payout amount reported
in the current tax returns (in Part X to XII) make six years of panel data available.
The 990-PF tax returns for the year of 2002 of the 108 corporate foundations were
collected from the Foundation Center, a non-profit research organization that archives
Form 990s. The Part V of the tax returns contains six-years of data for each foundation
but due to the availability of the KLD data, the years of 1998 to 2002 data were used in
this study. This formed a panel data set including 540 observations that is used to
examine hypothesis two.

Measurements

The measurements of hypothesis one in this study were obtained from Corporate
Foundation Profile (Jones, 2000), which contains information of 181 corporate
foundations for the year of 1998 or 1999. Hypothesis one, the relationship between the
current tax policy and the fulfillment of corporate foundations’ social function, is
measured by the difference between the amount of grant money donated to support
traditional charities and the amount donated to support research and public policies
studies. The amounts given by corporate foundations are dichotomized into funds for
research organizations and for charities according to the mission and the nature of the
receiving organization. In this study, institutions undertaking any preventive, discovery,
and policy-related studies are considered to be research organizations. On the other hand,
examples of charitable organizations provided by IRS (Publication No. 557) include, but
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are not limited to, the following: the organization’s purpose is for relief of the poor, the
distressed, or the underprivileged; advancement of religion; improvement of education or
science; maintenance of public buildings, lessening the burdens of government and other
activities with similar goals.
Among these charitable donations, the purpose of grants to educational
organizations is unclear whether it is used to add new buildings or to support research.
According to the IRS (Publication No. 557), contributions to schools can be used to
improve facilities, to endow a professorial chair, to pay employees’ salaries, to fund
student activities, or to support research. For the purpose of this study, the contributions
to higher educational institutions are assumed to be used for research purpose. Under this
assumption, the amount of research grant money given by corporate foundations for
research is inflated or overstated. If there is still a significant difference between the
amount of grant money given to traditional charities and the amount of inflated research
grant money, the test result of hypothesis one will be strongly supported. In addition,
Galaskiewicz (1997) reports that the industry attributes of the sponsoring company are
likely to affect the amount of grant money to certain social institutions. Thus corporate
foundations sponsored by pharmaceutical companies may be more likely to support
medical related studies and research. This study, however, does not control for this
possible industry effect because, as stated previously, inflated research amounts may
strengthen the findings if hypothesis one is supported. Hypothesis 1 is tested by paired
samples T-test.
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The data used to test hypotheses two were obtained directly from tax returns of
corporate foundations (990-PF). Hypothesis two, which is concerned with the primary
motivation for corporate foundations giving, is measured by the difference between the
amount of total grant money and the minimum amount of payout requirement. The total
giving amount and the fair market value of average assets of each corporate foundation
over a six- year period are reported on Part V of Form 990-PF. The minimum amount of
payout requirement is equaled to 5% of the total average asset’s market value.
The control variable, the legitimacy need of the parent company, is measured by
the sum of the concerns scores reported by the social research firm Kinder, Lydengerg,
Domini’s (KLD) Socrates database9. Although several other corporate social
performance reports are available, the numbers of companies or the dimensions of
corporate social performance covered by these reports are limited. On the other hand,
KLD data offer several desirable qualities. KLD has quantifiable social records of over
3,000 publicly traded U.S. companies across a range of dimensions pertaining to business
related social concerns. Moreover, KLD’s data have been used extensively in a growing
body of largely management-based U.S. research on corporate social performance issues
(e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997a, 1997b; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Agle et al., 1999;
Berman et al., 1999; Greening and Turban, 2000; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Ruf et al.,
2001; Rehbein et al., 2004), and recently have also been applied in accounting research
(e.g. Cho, Patten and Roberts, 2005), and the second study of this dissertation. Most

9

Socrates is a proprietary database program issued by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & CO. Inc. that provides
access to KLD’s ratings and other data pertaining to the social records of over 3,000 publicly traded U. S.
companies.
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importantly, these data have been validated as the best currently available measurements
of corporate social performance (Sharfman, 1996; Szwajkowski and Figlewicz, 1999). A
complete and detailed description of the KLD rating system is available from Waddock
and Graves (1997a, 1997b) and KLD’s website (www.kld.com).
KLD separately assigns strengths and concerns across eight social performance
dimensions. These dimensions are community, corporate governance, diversity,
employee relations, environment, human rights, product, and others (KLD, 2003). The
sum of the concern scores of the eight dimensions are used to measure the sponsoring
corporations’ needs of legitimacy for the selected years.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are tested by regression. The difference between the
amount of total contributions (total grant monies plus administrative expenditures10) and
the amount of minimum payout requirement is the dependent variable. KLD concern
scores are the control variables. If the coefficient of the constant is significant with a
negative sign, then hypothesis 2a is supported, which indicates that the annual amount of
contributions given by a corporate foundation does not significantly exceed its minimum
payout requirement after their parent company’s legitimacy needs are accounted for.
This result suggests that the giving behavior of corporate foundations is primarily guided
by tax benefits. On the other hand, if the coefficient of the constant is significant with a
positive sign, then hypothesis 2b prevails, which support that the annual amount of
contribution given by corporate foundations significantly exceeds the minimum payout
requirement after controlling for the legitimacy need of the parent company. Thus, the

10

On average the amount of administrative expenditures is 4.19% of the total contributions with a range of
0% to 63.21%.
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main motivation of corporate foundations’ giving is to strategically manage firms’
environment.

Analysis of the Results
Analytical procedures

The description of the sample corporate foundation is presented in Table 3-2. The
average ending asset was $49.43 million, with a range of 0 to $441.25 million. The
average age of the foundation at the end of 1998 or 1999 was 30.90, with a range of 1 to
82. The foundation donated, on average, $9.52 million to various organizations, with the
least amount donated being $1.10, and the highest amount donated being $67.89 million.

Table 3-2 Summary of Sample Corporate Foundations
Min

Max

Mean

Assetsa
0
441.25
49.43
Age
1
82
30.90
Total Grant given
1.10
67.89
9.52
Grants to Charities
0.92
63.27
8.10
Grants to research/public policy studies
0
11.21
1.42
a
in million except for age. N=181
Source: Corporate Foundation Profiles by The Foundation Center (2002).

Standard
Deviation
76.93
16.60
10.56
9.02
2.10

Hypothesis one, the difference between the amount of grant money to traditional
charities and to research and public policies studies, was tested by paired samples T-Test
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and is significant at the 0.000 level with a t score statistic of 11.61. A summary of
corporate foundation grant money distribution by recipient and percentage is presented in
Table 3-3. The corporate foundations gave, on average, approximately $8.10 million to
traditional charities, which accounted for 85.08 percentage of the total grant money;
followed by higher education $1.21(12.71%), public policy studies $0.09 (0.95%),
medical research $0.08 (0.84%), and other research $0.04 million (0.42%).

Table 3-3
Summary of Corporate Foundation Payout Behaviors by Recipient and Percentage
Charities
Amount* (mean)
Percentage
* in millions

8.10
85.08

Higher
Education
1.21
12.71

Public
Policy
0.09
0.95

Medical
Research
0.08
0.84

Research
0.04
0.42

Hypothesis two was tested using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with
group dummy variables, and Hausman tests indicate random model is appropriated for
the data set. Table 3-4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables, and the test
results of the model are presented in Table 3-5.

Table 3-4
Descriptive Statistics
Amount above

Min
-1,269.29

Max
161,848.76
120

Mean
12,386.99

S. D.
17,955.85

required pay-out*
KLD

0

16

3.60

2.87

N=540 * in thousand ($)

The difference between the amount of grant monies and the required payout, on
average, is $12,386.99 thousand with a range of $ -1,269.29 to $ 161,848.76 thousand.
The sponsoring company’s legitimacy needs, on average, is 3.60 with a range of 0 to 16,
as measured by KLD rating scores. The correlation between the KLD scores and the
amount of grant monies above the required payout is 0.279, which is significant at the
0.01 level.

Table 3-5
Regression results for corporate foundation giving motivation test
Dependent variable = difference between the amount of total contributions and required
payout for 1998-2002.
Expected
OLS Random Model
sign
Parameter
Standard
Sig.a
estimates
error
KLD
+
1498.47
268.95
0.000
Constant
+/6992.50
1789.67
0.000
Model Statistics
Model
F-statistic = 20.22
Sig.
Sig. at the 0.000 level
R-squared
Adjusted R2 = 0.79
N =540. Mean KLD score is 3.60 with a range of 0 to 16.
The random model is significant at the 0.000 level with a F score statistic of 20.22,
and the adjusted coefficient of correlation (R2) for the random model is 0.79. The control
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variable (KLD) and constant are both significant with a positive sign. The overall results
support hypothesis 2b.

Discussion of research findings

The particular social functions of private foundations such as corporate sponsored
foundations are theorized to provide alternative solutions to social issues by supporting
research and public policy studies. However, the empirical results indicate that corporate
foundations gave more than 85% of their grant monies to traditional charities, and less
than 15% of their grant monies were used to carry out their social function. Whether the
resources of foundations should be used primarily to substitute governmental
expenditures, to mitigate social inequality or to support research that may provide
answers to challenging social problems are important public policy issues. The current
tax laws do not appear to require that foundations fulfill their commonly agreed upon
specific social function. Amendments to the current tax laws may be necessary if society
agrees that the social function of foundations is different from that of charities and desire
foundations to carry out their specific social roles.
The timing for corporations to donate (transfer) funds to their sponsored
foundations, as suggested by many economic studies, may be primarily motivated by tax
advantages. The research results, however, reveal that one primary motivation of
corporate foundation giving, the resources outflow from foundations to society, is a
strategic desire to manage their parent company’s business environment. Corporate
foundations gave more grant monies than the amount required by the tax laws. Moreover,
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corporate foundations donate even more monies when their parent company’s social
legitimacy need is high. After the influence of sponsoring corporation’s legitimacy need
is controlled, foundations still gave out more grant money than necessary. These
research findings provide a strong support to hypothesis 2b that corporations use their
foundation giving as the premium of social and political insurance to manage their
business environment. In addition, the giving behavior of corporate foundation seems to
be different from that of other private foundation. Sansing and Yetman (2002) document
that private foundation in general have a tendency to minimize their payouts. The results
of this current study concentrated only on corporate foundations, however, indicate that
the annual amount of contribution given by corporate foundations extensively exceeds
the minimum payout requirement.
According to the results of this current study, one may question the social value of
corporate foundations in their current practices. As private foundations, they do not
provide adequate funds to support research; as corporate foundations, they are used by
their parent company as a strategic instrument to manage the sponsoring company’s
social legitimacy and business surroundings.

Conclusions and Limitations
There were two purposes in this study. The first one was to empirically test the
relationship between the current tax laws and the fulfillment of corporate foundations’
social roles. The second objective was to examine whether tax advantage or strategic
management desire is the primary motivation of corporate foundation giving. The results
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indicate that the current tax laws do not provide incentives for foundations to support
research and public policy studies. The research findings also reveal that corporate
foundation giving is motivated more by a desire for strategic management than tax
benefits. However, this study does not exclude tax advantage as one of the motivations
of corporate foundation giving.
Several future research directions are suggested by the findings of this present
study. First, the effects of tax laws on the selection of recipients or grant monies
allocation between charities and research could be tested by experimental studies.
Second, this study could be refined using direct measures of managers’ understanding of
their legitimacy needs as control variable. Finally, the social functions of foundations
could be further identified by historical review.
As with any research, this study has certain limitations. This study has relied on
the categorization scheme provided by Corporate Foundation Profiles; a detailed
breakdown as to who were the recipients of corporate foundations giving was beyond the
scope of this current study. The empirical tests were performed on large corporate
foundations that may restrict the generalizability of the findings. The social roles of
foundations adopted by this study may be subject to debate.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION

This dissertation consists of three studies related to accounting disclosure at the
interface of organizations and society. The first study investigates the overlapping
perspectives of legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and
stakeholder theory and integrates these theories into a more cohesive meta-theory of the
organization-society interface. Although the primary function of business entities is
economic in nature, business entities must pursuit their economic roles in a socially
acceptable matter. Study one concludes that some corporations may initiate social
activities to gain economic benefit but others may undertake the same social activities to
win social acceptance. Thus, this comprehensive meta-theory provides a sound
theoretical foundation to substantiate the value of social and environmental accounting
research because social activities participation is necessary for business to maintain their
societal legitimacy.
The second study examines how corporate managers rationalize their charitable
contributions while their corporations are concurrently facing other business-related
social issues. Even though Carroll (1979) hypothesizes that managers would allocate
more resources to attend to their business –related social problems and thus have less
resources available for philanthropy, the empirical results support the competing
hypothesis forwarded by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975). Dowling and Pfeffer posit that
business-related social issues would jeopardize corporation’s social legitimacy. Thus,
corporate executives would give more donations in an attempt to manage their legitimacy.
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These study findings suggest that corporations should be required to disclose all their
social and environmental performance information along with the amount of their
donations. It is because the amount of money and resources donated by corporations
seems to be associated with questionable business practices rather than an indicator of
social friendliness, as misperceived by the public.
The third study analyzes the relationship between the current tax laws and the
fulfillment of corporate foundations’ social functions. Using data from corporate
foundations’ tax returns, this study concludes that amendments to the current tax laws
appear to be necessary. Under current tax laws, corporate foundations do not carry out
their functions to support research and public policy studies. Moreover, although we
should not forget the fact that corporations foundations do really give donations,
corporations appear to use their foundations as a tool to manage their business
environment and purchase their social legitimacy.
In sum, these three studies build upon prior theoretical and empirical work to
substantiate and advance social and environmental accounting research. The empirical
findings of this dissertation all have important public policy applications.
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